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French economist, Leroy-Beaulieu, has been quoted
as saying:
There are some sciences so lofty and serene that they
leave in peace those who are not concerned with them,
but finance ... is not one of these: it has a way
of taking a terrible revenge upon nations and upon
individuals who neglect or despise it.
Since the time of the first U. S. Secretary of the
Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, until the mid~1930
*
s i there
has been a reluctance on the part of Presidents to actively
participate in the affairs of the economy. This reluctance
was due in part to the accepted base of fiscal systems.
Government finance was not considered a part of the executive
powers; and what activity was evident, was considered to be
the proper domain of Congress.
The base of Federal fiscal systems, prior to 1930,
rested on two concepts. The first of these was a concept
that all governmental activity was defined by money cost.
Fiscal discipline required a "pay as you go" approach. There-
fore, the actions of a President, in relation to reduction
of debt and annually-balanced budgets, were equated to
*A. E. Buck, The Budget in Governments of Today ,
(New York: The Macmillan Company^ 193^) • P. V.

2responsible use of power. The second concept implied
Federal government "neutrality" or non-interference with
the free market mechanisms of the economy. Under no
circumstance was governmental action permitted to restrain
the internal economic sector. Manifestations of this
reluctance to enter as an active participant in the economy
were the absence of a national budget system until 1921 and
the fact that the budget was not recognized as an economic
document until nearly twenty-five years later.
Presidential and political party philosophies
effected various changes in interpertation of Federal finance
and what I shall call executive "fiscalism" - Presidential
fiscal participation. It will be the intention of the author
to trace the development of conservative and liberal
Presidential attitudes toward fiscal policy responsibility
throughout the history of the United States.
Since the national debt and the dollar cost of
government activity was the key to responsible finance, prior
to 1930, Chapters II and III will trace developments in
fiscal thought as reflected in levels of the national debt.
Chapter IV depicts a period of revolution of fiscal thinking
from 1932-1952, in an environment of a depression, two
recessions, and two wars . The period, 1952-1 960, represented
a conservative approach to fiscal thought with an attempt
to rely on automatic fiscal stabilizers, rather than

3discretionary policy, and is presented in Chapter V, The
peak of the rise of executive fiscalism occurred during
the decade of the Sixties, as reflected in Chapter VI.
With the rise came a fall and a return to sobriety and
practicality.
The analysis will include the following:
1. The development of Presidential attitudes toward the
economic role of the Federal government;
2. Presidential attitudes toward debt and balanced
budgets
;
3. Twenty-five years of exposure to bi-partisan national
economic goals;
k. The development of rising executive fiscal power; and,






In early days, no distinction was made between
the revenues of kings or emperors and those of the state.
When the ruler needed money or resources, he either obtained
them by subscription, or borrowed and gave his personal
pledge for repayment. This pledge was frequently backed by
royal estates or jewels.
However, the Revolution of 1 6 88, in England, brought
about many changes in government.
,
From that time on, by
Parlimentary action, the credit of the entire nation was
used as security for debts undertaken on behalf of the nation.
This event earmarked the beginning of the history of national
debt: an item which was to become an integral and sometimes
crucial determinate of national policy throughout the history
of our nation.*
The policies for debt creation, after the Revolution
of 1688, centered around obtaining capital from three companies
the East India Company; the South Sea Company; and later, in
^''National Debt," The American Educator Encyclopedia ,




516 9^ » the Bank of England. 2 Debt repayment was initially
through tax revenues but included use of a sinking fund
concept, proposed by Sir Robert Wadpole, and established by
the Act of 1716. The sinking fund concept v;as later to have
significant impact on establishment of our own fiscal policies.
The principle involved use of the compound interest revenue
from the fund for the reduction of war-created national debt.
Although the fund did succeed in making some impact on the
reduction of England's national debt, Wadpole* s reluctance
to raise taxes to facilitate reduction of an increased debt
and his repeated raids on the fund until 1752, signaled
elimination of the debt reduction application. 3 However, the
concepts of a sinking fund and a national bank were borrowed
for establishment of our nation's first positive fiscal
policy.
History is replete with opinions regarding the
evils of public or private debt. About the time of the
American Revolution, one of the leading classical economists,
Adam Smith, had stated:
• . . the enormous debts which at present oppress, and
will in the long run probably ruin all the great nations
in Europe ...
2 E. L. Hargreaves, The National Debt , (London: Edward
Arnold and Company, 1930) t P» 7»
3Donald E. Swanson, The Origins of Hamilton's Fiscal
Policies
,
(Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press,
1963), P. 20.
^Adam Smith, (James E. Rodgers , ed.), The Wealth of
Nations, Vol. II, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press," 1869) , P. 511 •

6The views of Smith and other classicists reflected
the prevalent view that the role of the state should be
limited. They felt that expenditures made "by the state
should be limited and paid concurrently. They were protagonists
of balanced budgets, debt retirement, and sound money policy.
Seymour Harris has stated that they felt:
Government is unproductive; it maintains unproductive
labor, whereas industry maintains productive labor
.... Funding of ... a public debt means a
corresponding reduction of private capital
. . .
these
were the keystones of Smith's views on , , . public
debt.
5
David Ricardo, another prominent classical economist,
voiced similar views regarding the distasteful, but perhaps
necessary, minimal government activity. However, he felt
that if public spending were absolutely necessary, the state
should have recourse to taxation, not loans. Regarding the
then present national debt, he disagreed with a perpetual
funding plan and proposed an immediate levy on property.
Lewis Kimmel relates Ricardo's viewpoint as:
, . . thus by one great effort, . . . get rid of one of




These were the economic views and debt systems which
our early leaders had been exposed to at the time of the
5seymour E. Harris, The National Debt and the New
Economics
,
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 19^-7)
•
P. 51.
°Lewis H. Kimmel, Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy :
1789-1958
,
(Washington, D. C. : The Brookings Institute,
1959), P. hZ.

7American Revolution. It was a "live within your means
attitude" and a limited role for the state which dominated
thinking of the day. The precedent for the perpetuity of
national debt had been established by England as far back as
169^, and various debt reduction techniques had been proposed
and tested.
It is of interest to note, however, that the classical
economists just assumed the economic role of the state must
be limited, and then they deducted certain rationalizations
regarding the nature of government fiscal operations. For
example, Adam Smith was felt to believe that loans, if
available and used, would enhance political power and, there-
fore, encourage the leaders to wage needless wars .
7
Official attitudes in our nation, toward Federal
expenditures and national debt, found strong support in the
mainstream of the classical economic thought. The pronounce-
ment of Presidents and other officials appears to resemble
closely the views of the leading economists. The familiarity
of the politicians with economic ideas was enhanced by the
fact that until late in the nineteenth century, economics was
regarded as a branch of moral philosophy or moral science, a
subject in which the politicians were of necessity well-versed.
The chaotic finances during the Revolutionary War
?Jesse Burkhead, Governmental Budgeting
,
(New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959), P. ^31.

8and for several years thereafter, indicated familiar pains
of a nation recovering from a war with the added burden of
a loose confederacy. National budget policy concerned itself
primarily with the money costs of past war activity and
attempts to subscribe revenues from the states. It appeared
that pre-constitutional period precedents for fiscal policy
were largely the work of Robert Morris, These included
attempts to make provisions for import duties to pay off the
very high interest burden, provide for a sinking fund, and
pay off the principal of the national debt contracted during
the war. These proposals did not accept the perpetuity of
national debt, but were attempts to recognize the existance
and make some provisions for the national debt."
A Beginning
To insure continuity and to make provisions for
fiscal integrity, Article VI, Section 1, of the Constitution
states
:
All debts contracted and engagements entered into, before
the adoption of this Constitution shall be as valid
against the United States under this Constitution, as
under the Confederation , , .9
Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the
Treasury, expanded the application of this article by
"Swans on, Hamilton's Fiscal Policies
, p. 50.
^"Constitution of the United States," The American
Educator Encyclopedia, Vol. Ill, p. 933.

9requesting assumption by the Federal government of all states'
contracted pre-constitution war debts as well as previous
Federal debt. 10 Consolidation of these debts resulted in
an assumed national debt of more than 75 million dollars.
(Table 2-1).
A debt of 75 million dollars may appear small today.
However, to a new nation ravaged by war and inflation, and
composed of a population of 3.9 million people - most of
whom were poor farmers, traders, or frontiersmen - a debt
representing $1 9. 12 per capita, must have seemed a monumental
undertaking.
Alexander Hamilton advocated a very strong executive
fiscal function. He felt that governments should attempt to
determine as well as control the state of the economy.
^
History has shown that his views, although nearly 150 years
ahead of recognition, were effective in accomplishing what
were the primary concerns of the day. The primary concern of
President Washington, and his Secretary of the Treasury, was
the reestablishment of public credit on the domestic and
international scene. This, in itself, was no small task with
confidence in the government's ability to pay, in 1791. so
low that certificates of public indebtedness were being sold
lOSwanson, Hamilton's Fiscal Policies
, p. 5^«
11James T-IacGregor Burns, Presidential Government -
The Crucible of Leadership
,
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aS0URCE: Davis Rich Dewey, Financial History of the United
States
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(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939) 1
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^SOURCE: U. S. Treasurer, Annual Report , 1 96 8 , (Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969). P. 60.
cFigures are rounded to nearest millions of dollars.
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at ten to twenty cents on the dollar.
I
2
Hamilton has been credited with the view that a
national debt, if not excessive, is a national blessing. 1 3
However, evidence bears out the fact that both Hamilton and
Washington favored debt primarily from the standpoint of
establishing credit and consistent with the opinions of the
times emphasized thrift and care in the excerise and use of
public funds. 1^ In addition, Hamilton did propose that the
entire debt should be extinguished in not more than thirty
years or by 1825. Swanson stated that his views regarding
debt as a national blessing were primarily concerned with
the facility that the debt gave to reestablishment of credit.
Hamilton did not have reference to the perpetuity of the debt,
but, rather the feasibility of repayment.* 5 in other words
,
Hamilton felt that debt repayment at that time was impossible.
The first positive treatment of the national debt
was the passage of the Funding Acts of August k, 10, and 12,
1890. Using the authority granted by these acts relative to
assumption of debts, import duties, and loan authorization,
Hamilton succeeded in restoring credit on an international
l2«Tne committee on National Debt Policy," Our
National Debt
,
(Mew York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc.,
19^9), P. 10.
^Harris, The National Debt
, p. 59.
l^Roy A. Foulke, National Thrift and the Public Debt ,
(New York: Dun and Brads treet, Inc. , 19^ ) i P . 9.
15swans on, Hamilton's Fiscal Policy, p. 80.

12
and domestic scene in the astounding short period of one
year. Rapid repayment and subsequent current payment of
interest on the outstanding debt, which amounted to one half
of all government expenditures during the period 1789-1797
»
restored government debt issues to par and established sound
credit. *°
Hamilton's fiscal policies were composed of the
following:
1. The funding system as a means of handling the special
debt problems created by financing the Revolution;
2. The sinking fund; and,
3. The Bank of the United States. 1 ?
The nation's first positive financier fell into disfavor
largely because of the stigma attached to the similarity of
his fiscal policy and those of the British. His drive for a
executive budget was not to be reborn until after 1900.!°
President John Adams (1797-1801), although also a
Federalist, continued Hamilton's policies only in a low key.
There was clear indication that as long as a debt existed,
debt retirement should be the primary goal and that a surplus
was highly desirable. Adams did not, however, adhere to the
positive policy of maintaining economic affairs through the
Executive Branch of the government. This slight movement
l6 lbid
., p. 84. 17 lbid . , p. 4.
i8a. E. Buck, Public Budgeting
,
(New York: Harper
and Brothers Co., 1929), p. 17.
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away from the Hamiltonian model was a forewarning of the era
to follow. Adams did, however, continue his support of the
goal of sound credit and funded debt as primary. *9
The defeat of the Federalists signified by the
election of Thomas Jefferson, in 1801, denoted a change of
fiscal policy which was to remain with political administration
until after 1930. With the exception of the Louisiana Purchase,
Jefferson's administration, and those to follow, made debt
extinguishment and retrenchment of Federal activity a prime
goal, Jefferson actively cut back on existing Federal defense
and manpower systems and defined the first charge of govern-
ment revenues to the discharge of the national debt. Jeffer-
son's administration officially accepted the "living generation"
thesis that no present generation should make any obligation
on future generations. Therefore, if it were necessary to
incur public debts, these debts should be extinguished within
something like twenty years from incurrence, ^0 jt shall
become apparent this thesis remained germane to political
thought until the Second World War dictated a restructuring
of thinking regarding the national debt.
However, even with Jefferson's fetish about public
debt, it was not until 1806, that the national debt had been






reduced to the amount which had been assumed in 1791.
Subsequent active pursuit to generating a surplus reduced
the national debt to ^5 million dollars by the time of the
outbreak of the War of 1812 (Table 2-1). This first experience
of war by the constitutional government forced a sharp increase
in the national debt to 127 million dollars by 1815 (Table 2-1),
with serious post-war inflation. The inflation was so severe
that at one point, treasury securities were sold at only
nineteen cents on the dollar. The significance of the debt
reflected about thirteen per cent of the national income as
compared to approximately ten per cent in 1791. 2l
Presidents following Jefferson favored balanced
peacetime budgets with provisions for reduction and eventual
elimination of the national debt. Presidents James Madison,
James Monroe, and John Quincy Adams, interpreted this policy
as duty and as an indication of the financial stability and
maturity of a nation. Fortunately for them, after the War of
1812, the nation grew rapidly. Although government expendi-
tures moved up slowly (Table 2-1), receipts from customs and
sale of public land were easily enough to provide for a surplus
and consistent reduction of the national debt, 22
2lThe Committee on National Debt Policy, Our National
Debt
, p. 12,
22Davis Rich Dewey, Financial History of the United
States
,
(New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1939) » PP. 168-170,
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President Andrew Jackson (1829-1836), followed with
even stronger views regarding the evils of a national debt.
Jackson embraced earlier economic views that:
1. interest on the national debt was a burden on the
working class;
2. interest payments involved a redistribution of
income in favor of the well-to-do; and,
3# capital freed from debt reduction could be used
for productive reasons, 2 3
The administration of President Jackson accomplished a feat
not since repeated in this nation's history. In l835t the
interest-bearing national debt had been eliminated and total
gross national debt was only thirty-seven thousand dollars
(Table 2-1). Kimmel states that satisfaction from this feat
would be understandable, especially when it is acknowledged
that national debt was then considered not only a misfortune
of the war, but also evil and immoral. 2^
During the period, 1801-1837, the view consistently
held was that government should be frugal and should only
undertake essential expenditures. The mere presence of a
national debt became the pivital factor in fiscal policy.
Internal taxes, except in wartime, had been opposed, and
revenues were amply furnished by customs and the sale of land.
National debt was considered oppressive and immoral, dictating








a fiscal policy based on concurrent financing without
recourse to loans. All debt was felt to be a burden and
interest payments an unjust transfer-type payment.
A New Beginning
President Van Buren's consternation about the
possibility of surplus revenues, in 1836, without the existence
of any national debt was short-lived. The financial panic of
1837 resulted in a sharp decline of customs revenues and a
substantial deficit. The annual deficit grew to a level of
12.3 million dollars by the end of l837. 2 -5 This event presented
a new dilemma in national fiscal policy. A substantial debt
had been created in time of peace. Wartime deficits had been
accepted as unfortunate, but, the concept of a recession had
not yet been accepted within the definition of a national
emergency. This embarrasement of peacetime deficits never
fully departed from the political arena.
The national debt varied from a low of 3*3 million
dollars to a high of 37.7 million dollars during the period
from 1836-18^-5. President James Polk's (18^-5-18^9) pledge
after the deficit years, 18^-0-18^3, to once again rid the
nation of debt was thwarted by the War with Mexico in 1 8*1-6.
Although the war did not cause funding difficulties, the debt
25Dewey, Financial History, pp. 231-2^7.
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had once again begun an upward trend. ° Increased national
debt after the War with Mexico caused renewed concern over
the inability to eliminate the debt. Pressure for increased
Federal spending for internal improvements was not successful.
Internal improvements were viewed as unconstitutional
extensions of Federal activity and the national debt had
once again proven its potency as a determinant of national
fiscal policy. In addition, the financial panic of 1857-1858,
set the stage for decreased revenues and an end to debt retire-
ment until after the Civil War. ? By i860, the national debt
had risen to nearly 65 million dollars (Table 2-1).
The prevalent approach to Federal activity, during
the period 1801-1860, had been in money costs or an approach
from a fiscal aspect only. The comparison of logic between
government finance and household finance would remain long
after i860. This view, regarding comparison of public and
private debt, overlooks the fallacy of composition. 2 " What
was true for the individual household could very well be bad
for the economy.
Three key ideas were accepted by Federal officials,
regarding national debt and fiscal policy, during the period
26 Ibid
., pp. 255-256.
27Kimmel, The Federal Budget
,
p. 28.
28paul A. Samuels on, Economics - An Introductory




1. a low level of public expenditure was desired;
2. the Federal budget should be balanced in times of
peace; and,
3. the Federal debt should be reduced and eventually
extinguished. 2
9
These views inferred minimal interference with the
economy since expenditures would be low. In fact, Federal
expenditures -were only to 63 million dollars annually before
the start of the Civil War (Table 2-1). It will become
evident, in the following Chapters, that even though expendi-
tures in peacetime periods tended to rise after the Civil
War 1 the existence of a national debt and the concept of
balanced budgets remained primary determinants of fiscal
policy. Political controversy over protective tariffs and
taxation, although prevalent until after 1930, remained
subjects of concern for sufficient revenues even though there
were extended periods, when sufficient revenues were not a
problem.





The decade beginning in i860, marked the beginning
of a new era. The decade of the l850*s had seen increasing-
conflict regarding the scope of Federal activity and the
proper level of governmental responsibility. A serious
review of sources of revenue, monetary systems, and general
administration of expenditure powers would surface during
this period.
One reaction to these questions, within the back-
ground of a rapidly expanding nation, was the creation of new
political parties. Of these political parties, the Republican
party, formed in 185^, was to become a major political force
in the execution of fiscal policy for the majority of the
ensuing seventy-two years. This party was to retain executive
direction of fiscal policy and debt management for fourteen
of the eighteen Presidential terms from 1860-1932.
Indication of the thought which prevaded the political
arena just prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, was provided







that the people justly view with alarm the
reckless extravagance which prevades every depart-
ment of the Federal government; that a rapid return
to rigid economy and accountability is indispensable
to arrest the systematic plunder of the public
treasury by favored partisans, while the recent
startling developments of frauds and corruption
. . .
show that a change in administration is
imperatively demanded. -'-
While the question of debt did not appear to be an. issue in
the campaign of i860, the administration of available revenues
most definitely was an issue. The central issue relative to
the debt was concern regarding the means of financing which
were being used to fund the debt. The means of financing had
been short-term notes with interest rates at levels never
again approached until well after World War II.
The Civil War and Redevelopment
Abraham Lincoln, the first Republican Party President,
entered the political arena on the eve of another great war.
This war, partly because it was an internal war, was to
revolutionize financial methods of government administration.
Restoration of the public credit and provision for conducting
the war demanded unprecedented expenditures and commensurate
1Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson, National Party
Platforms - 1 6^-0-1 96^
,
(Urbana and London: University of
Illinois Press, 19&6T, P. 32.
2Robert A. Love, Federal Financing
,
(New York:
Columbia University Press, 1931 ) » P« 13^»
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revenues. Adding to the "burden of fiscal policy determination,
customs, the prime source of revenues, were severly interrupted
due to the division of states. A new philosophy of finance
was required and emerged.
A national banking system was established, in 1863»
to afford an outlet for government bonds and to provide bank
notes to supplement the currency in circulation. Custom duty
levels were raised, also internal income taxes were enacted
and progressively raised throughout the war in a vain attempt
to fill the gap between revenues and expenditures to stem the
pace of growing national debt. The income tax remained in
effect until 1872, and although it was only responsible for
raising 3^7 million dollars in revenue, this was considered
a heavy tax at that time.
3
During the war years, President Lincoln was not
overly alarmed at the, growing debt. War had remained an
accepted reason for accululation of debt. Lincoln viewed
the debt as another type of property and as long as it was
held internally by the people, they owed it to themselves.
Therefore, he considered the only matter of prime importance
was to closely monitor the distribution of the debt.
In addition to the new dimensions already mentioned
3Dewey, Financial History
, pp. 305-306.
^Kimmel, The Federal Budget, p. 65.
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as an outgrowth of the war - the national "banking system, the
income tax, and the high protective tariff - the size of the
national debt provided another eclipse which would not be
retraced. As the national debt had eclipsed the one hundred
million dollar mark for the first time during the culmination
of the VJar of 1812, so the national debt now surpassed the
one billion dollar mark, in 1863» and rose to an unprecedented
high of nearly 2.76 billion dollars, by 1866 (Table 3-1).
The existence of a very large national debt, plus a
high of 1.29 billion dollars in expenditures and an annual
deficit of 96^ million dollars, in 1865» brought about renewed
concern for debt reductions and decreased Federal spending.
5
The debt had indeed grown to proportions beyond belief. The
debt, in 1866, represented about 50 t 5 Per cent of the national
income as compared with 13 per cent after the VJar of 1812."
The Republican party platform, of 186^, had already
registered this concern when it stated:
. . .
the pledge for the redemption of the public debt
must be kept inviolate
. , . we recommend economy and
rigid responsibility in the public expenditures . . .
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a„SOURCE: Davis Rich Dewey, Financial History of the United
States
,
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939),
pp. 269, 329, 401, 429, and 475.
bS0URCE: U. S. Treasurer, Annual Report, 1968
,
(Washington,
D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1969),
pp. 60-6l.




typical war aftermath view of the debt size and Federal
activity. He could not reconcile the fact that the war after-
math required a Federal budget level above pre-war levels.
He advocated speedy debt repayment and a retrenchment of
Federal activity. He considered the debt as burdensome and
evil. His views were echoed, in 1865» by Secretary of the
Treasury, Hugh McCulloch, in considering the influence of
debt which "adds to the power of the Executive by increasing
Federal patronage. "° Their views were similar to others who
had common concern after the war about the growing trend
toward a financial aristocracy centered in the northern states.
The Republican party views of the Jackson adminis-
tration were reiterated in the Republican Party Platform of
1868, I.872, and 1876, although the emphasis appeared to have
drifted from primary concern for the economic burden of the
debt itself to provisions of protection for national labor
and capital growth. The Jackson era had stressed repayment
of interest and principal within a specified period. The
Republican Presidential policies which followed stressed
maintenance of credit, reduction and elimination of internal
taxes, and higher protective custom duties. This shift from
debt repayment to decreased taxes and protection appeared in
8u. S. Treasurer, Annual Report of the Secretary of
the Treasury, l865 t (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing
Office, 1865), p. 16.
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the platform of 1872, which stated, in part:
. . .
the revenues necessary for current expenditures
and the obligation of the public debt (repayment)
. . .
must be largely derived from duties on importation,
which
. . .
should be adjusted as to promote the interest
of the American labor and promote the prosperity of the
whole nation.
9
In the decade beginning in 1880, the Republicans claimed that
without resorting to loans, they had;
. . .
paid 880 million dollars of the public debt and
by refunding the balance at lower rates, had reduced
the annual interest charge from nearly 150 million
dollars annually to less than 89 million dollars
annually.^
However, Republican party Presidents were facing a
dilemma similar to what Presidents Jackson and Van Buren had
faced in 1835-1837. Annual budget surpluses, ranging from a
low of 63 million dollars to a high of 1^5 million dollars
(about one half of the average expenditure), appeared every
year of the decade beginning in 1880.
The Republican President, Chester Arthur, had been
unable to cope with the problem of surpluses by 188*1-, and was
succeeded in office by the first Democratic party President
in almost twenty-five years, Grover Cleveland. This shift in
parties was only to happen twice during the years from 1860-
1912, as the Democrats once again gained single term control







of the Executive Branch of the government in 1893*
During this period, the advocates of high protective
tariffs, principally the Republicans, would not accept the
solution of decreasing governmental revenues "by changing
tariffs. Even attempting to lower taxes was an insufficient
approach to the problem since more than S5 per cent of total
revenues were derived from custom duties during this period.^
The social climate and philosophy would not permit a higher
level of expenditure. Efforts by Presidents of both parties
to perform a costly accelerated repayment of debt were not
successful since by 1886 all debt which was redeemable for
many years to come had been cancelled. ^^
It appeared that only one solution remained. In a
successful bid to regain the Presidency in the campaign of
1888, the Republican party had pledged to repeal all taxes
"rather than surrender any part of our protective systera."13
However, in l889» President Benjamin Harrison unsuccessfully
proposed a renewal of the sinking fund as the only lawful
and proper solution. He felt that open market purchases of
non-redeemable debt by the sinking fund would return the excess
revenues to the economy. Since the immediate effect of this
action would be to drive up the price of government bonds and









interest rates, the concept came under sharp criticism.
The Republicans, by passing the highly protective
McKinley Tariff of 1890, indirectly reduced the revenues and
essentially eliminated the problem of a surplus so that by
the end of fiscal year 1892, a surplus of only 9.9 million
dollars was experienced . 1 * The debt had been reduced by
1893 to a level of 961 million dollars, the last year in
our history that the national debt was ever less than one
billion dollars (Table 3-1).
Fiscal emphasis, prior to the turn of the century,
had been one of strict governmental economy and minimal scope
of governmental activity. However, the approach to govern-
mental responsibility was not as provincial as the strict
constructionalist philosophy prior to the Civil War. The
greatest expansion had come in the area of business and
commerce regulatory devices and various types of grants.
Rapid development of railroads and the absence of revenue
problems appeared to foster most of the shift in attitudes.
The financial panic of l893» coupled with continued
drop in export duties and the Spanish American War (I898)
,
caused six straight deficit years and a growth of the national
debt to over 1.^3 billion dollars (Table 3-1). President
McKinley (1897-1901) took the view during the waning years
l'+Swanson, Hamilton's Fiscal Policies, p. 8.
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of the century that internal financial conditions should not
be permitted to increase the national debt, Lewis Kimmel
comments that McKinley regarded strict economy as the only
solution. 5 He adhered to nineteenth century political thought
evident from the term of President Andrew Jackson, in l865i
that annually balanced Federal budgets and an orderly servicing
of the debt was essential. As the nation entered a new century,
national fiscal policy determination remained keyed closely
to the existance of the national debt.
The Dynamic Century
The first Republican party administration of the new
century claimed solid credit cards - success in the war, a
favorable international trade balance during the previous
three years of 1,4 billion dollars as compared to a total of
less than 400 thousand during the previous 107 years, continued
solid control of both houses of Congress, and conclusion of
the last year with a modest surplus after six straight deficit
1 fyears - four of which had been under a Democratic administration. 0
President Theodore Roosevelt began the new term with
solid tools and a revised interpretation of governmental
activity. The previous century had witnessed a somewhat
l5Kimmel, The Federal Budget
, p. 78.
^Porter, National Party Platforms, pp. 121-124.
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limited role of the government as a regulator with an accepted
cost as an interference in the economy. Although Roosevelt
did not shift to the opposite extreme to view government as
a well defined sector, he did foster the government's
"facilitating role," Lewis Kimmel relates that this govern-
ment would define it's fiscal responsibility to include
guidance of the self-initiator rather than reluctant regulation.
This was a step away from a pure laissez faire approach and a
half step toward the recognition of a clearly defined public
sector of the economy which developed after the 1930's. '
Presidents Roosevelt and Taft favored balanced
budgets and reduction of the debt. However, small progress
toward these goals was made during these three presidential
terms. During Roosevelt's term, the recession of 1902, and
the panic of 1907 hampered progress toward a reduction of
debt. In addition, the concept that economic government was
synonomous with low cost government was given less credence.
Government expenditures during this period increased at the
annual rate of four per cent without causing any apparent
alarm (Table 3-2). Pressure against highly protective tariffs
had caused adjustment in tariff laws and custom duties were no
longer sufficient to maintain the revenues required. As a
result, the Republicans approved a corporation tax in 1909i
17Kimrael, The Federal Budget, pp. 82-83.

TABLE 3-2
FEDERAL EXPENDITURE** AND DEBT DATA*3
Selected Years (1900-1932)
(Millions of Dollars)





















aS0URCE: Davis Rich Devrey, Financial History of the United
States
,
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939),
pp7~474, 495, 513, and 533.
^SOURCE: U. S. Treasurer, Annual Report, 1968 , (Washington,
D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1969), P. 6l.




and proposed the forerunner of the present progressive and
corporate income tax, which was ratified in 191^. However,
both taxes yielded less than 250 million dollars in revenue
in the first six years. y
Difficulties in meeting rising expenditures and
reducing the national debt led to greater calls for economy
and efficiency in government. Included in President Taft's
recommendations for increased economy and efficiency in 1912,
was the proposal to establish a formal Federal budget system.
However, the Democratic party had gained control of the House
of Representatives, in 1910, and the Executive in 1912.
Consequently, due to party differences, the budget system did
not gain approval until the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921 was issued under both a Republican legislature and the
1
return of a Republican President. 7
Although the return of the Democratic party to
Congress and the Presidency did not signal a change in the
attitude toward debt, very little progress toward reduction
of the debt was made prior to the First World War. Although
President Wilson was in favor of balanced budgets and was
disinclined toward borrowing, he did not hesitate to take
this route in addition to heavy taxation in the face of the
l°Dewey, Financial History
, pp. ^83-^91.
19Burknead, Governmental Budgeting, pp. 18-21.
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massive revenue requirements of the First World War.^0
Lack of official concern toward debt retirement
resulted in a debt of nearly 1.2 billion dollars still out-
standing at the beginning of the War (Table 3-2). During the
War, less than 30 per cent of the required revenues were
obtained by taxes and the debt once again was to an all time
high of 25.5 billion dollars by 1919. This amount represented
M per cent of the national income or a debt of 2^2 dollars
per person as compared to a Civil War debt of just over 75
dollars per person. 21
The normal procedure prior to the issue of treasury
certificates or bonds had been to obtain specific approval
from Congress for each issue. However, upon the passage of
the Second Liberty Bond Act, during the War, Congress consolidated
previous bond authorizations and set one limit. Subsequent
authorizations were then made by ammending the Second Liberty
Bond Act. 22 This tool of Congress to control expenditures and
the national debt remains within legal structure today. The
relative role that this limit has played in influencing fiscal
policy did not become evident until the decade of the Fifties
20cewey, Financial History
, pp. 500-50?.
21 Our National Debt
, p. 13.
22j4arshall A. Robinson, The National Debt Ceiling -
An Experiment in Fis cal Policy, (Washington, D. C. : The
Brookings Institution, 1959) , P. 2.
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when the limit was reached and additional authority was not
granted.
A Regression
The Republicans regained the Presidency in 1921,
in the shadow of war debt, a post-war inflation, and a current
recession. President Wilson had, during the previous adminis-
tration, set the tone for debt legislation by approving a
sinking fund provision for statutory debt reduction in the
Liberty Bond Act of 1919. 2 ^ However, President Harding took
an exceptionally hard line regarding all debt creation and
demanded expenditure policies at both Federal and state levels
of spending less than your income all of the time.^ His
views closely paralleled those of the Nineteenth century
concern for debt as immoral and employment of the falacy of
composition regarding- public and private debt comparison.
President Calvin Coolidge (1923-1928) took a more
moderate approach to the existing debt and stressed gradual
reduction commensurate with a balanced reduction of taxes.
President Coolidge regarded balanced budgets, rigid expenditure
control, and reformed tax programs as the essence of his fiscal
policy and as essentials for restoration of sound finance.






Of all of the previous administrations, which appeared in
action to give lip service to the concept of economy, the
party of this era was not only the most sincere, "but also
the most productive. 2 ^ However, the productivity was at the
expense of withdrawing from a concept of the Federal govern-
ment as a contributor rather than an interference mechanism.
This regression presented, even more of a hurdle for Presidents
Hoover and Roosevelt to overcome in the early years of the
depression.
The record of the Republicans incident to economy
was impressive from 192l-1929t The national debt had been
reduced an average of 900 million dollars a year; expenditures
for Federal activity had been reduced from over 6.1 billion
dollars in 1920 to less than 3.6 billion dollars in 1928 -
even during a rapid expansion of the economy (Table 3-2).
In addition, tax reductions had been effected by the Revenue
Acts of 1921, 1924, 1926, and 1928, which reduced annual pay-
ments by as much as 1.5 billion dollars annually. Also, even
though the Republicans had increased protective tariffs again








The ensuing Republican administration, under President
Hoover, was riding the tide upon acceptance of office. However,
the depression, which began in 1929 f was to force a recognition
of the governmental role in the economy, the meaning of debt,
and the proper definition of fiscal policy and power.
President Hoover had unique concepts regarding the
impact of balanced budgets and debt. He felt that tax decreases
had bolstered the economy during the 1920* s and that prompted
him to propose a tax reduction during 1930. He was a firm
believer in balanced budgets which included statutory reduction
of the national debt. In order. to maintain the balance and
restore confidence in the economy, he firmly believed in not
only a tax cut, but also an increase in public works expendi-
tures, both on the Federal and state level. 2?
President Hoover, in his appraisal and recognition
of the problem, approached the Hamiltonian model of the
Presidency in that he believed:
. . .
that the economy would not manage itself, but
thought the deliberate application of social knowledge
was necessary. 28
27Herbert Stein, The Fiscal Revolution in America
,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969) i P. 9.
28 Ibid., p. 8.
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However, he was dealing with a tool without much weight, since,
in 1929» the Federal expenditures were only about 2,5 per cent
of the gross national product and Federal purchases of goods
and services only amounted to about 1.3 per cent.
°
In addition to these factors, President Hoover did
not possess adequate information, could not depend upon an
independent Federal Reserve System to cooperate, and could
not control state government programs which had more impact
than the Federal government expenditures. In spite of these
factors, he doggedly pursued the goal of a balanced Federal
budget and increased public works expenditures. The advances
which he made by increasing public works expenditures were
lost two-fold by decreases in the private sector. In addition,
forecasted revenues were not to be realized since the national
income dropped by 53 per cent from 1929-1932.
The British retreat from the gold standard, on
September 21, 1931 t forced a decision by the President to
approve a tax increase in the Revenue Act of 1932. This Revenue
Act was to restore the balance to the budget and to prevent
national debt creation in competition with private application
for credit. There were few who challenged the tax increase
29 lbid.
, p. 1^.
30charles Cortez Abbott, Management of the Federal




since it was based on the traditional "sound finance" concept. 31
It did not cause a confrontation to the balanced budget concept
which had been a keynote of political fiscal policy for more
than a century.
President Hoover had been presented the challenge,
but he continued to hold to the concept of the balanced budget
as the key. He even initially refused to consider deletion of
the statutory debt reduction amount of ^-00 million per year to
eliminate the deficit. The statutory retirement had been
exceeded by previous Republican administrations by more than
3.25 billion dollars. 32 However, by the end of fiscal year
1932, Hoover deleted statutory debt reduction as part of his
balanced goal. The national debt had remained virtually stable
until the end of fiscal year 1932» when an increase of three
billion dollars was registered (Table 3-1 )•
President Hoover's administration, the last Republican
administration for a twenty year period, ended in disillusion-
ment. The traditional views endured to the end. Previous
peacetime prosperity, during which a national debt had been
reduced with regularity, would not allow discontinuance of a
similar policy even under adverse conditions. The debt and the
effects of debt had remained a determinant of the resulting
31stein, The Fiscal Revolution
, pp. 31-33.
32 ibid., p. 28.
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fiscal policy and had perhaps been a deterent to successful
development of a more positive approach. The concept of a
government in money terms only, a government of little inter-
ference, remained prominent until challenged by the Democratic
party administrations to follow. These challenges reshaped




Explaining Away the Difference
The years prior to 1930 had witnessed some evolution
of thought regarding proper levels of governmental activity
within the framework of the traditional concept of annually
balanced budgets. However, the last half of the Hoover
administration and the ensuing twenty years were to experience
an accidental revolution of thought: not only towards the
proper role of government, but also toward a definition of a
"fiscally responsible" government.* It will become evident
that the shift in philosophies was caused more by accident
than by design. The explicit national policies, which evolved,
were reactions to the frustration of a prolonged depression, a
total war, and the subsequent development of an environment of
enlarged dimensions.
The record of the Republican party, from 1921-1930
i
in fiscal matters, had been impressive. For eleven years, the
U. S. Treasury had enjoyed a surplus averaging 760 million
dollars. The national debt had been reduced from nearly 2k
billion dollars , in 1921, to nearly 16 billion dollars at the
39

end of fiscal year 1930. During the same period, taxes had
been reduced five times and yet, revenues had been sufficient
to cancel almost twice the statutory annual debt retirement
total of Ur.h billion dollars. 1
However, the Republican party was faced with disaster
in 1932. President Hoover and his last two Secretaries of the
Treasury, Ogden Mills and William Woodfin, were to find that
even the bi-partisan Revenue Act of 1932, for increased taxes,
was not sufficient to restore the balance between expenditures
and forecasted revenues. Hoover's established goal of a
"balanced budget," as the keystone to recovery from the depres-
sion, signalled his downfall.
The deficit for fiscal year 1932, amounted to nearly
three billion dollars (Table ^--1). President Hoover had
persisted in forecasting a balanced budget at least by fiscal
year 193^-t but, the tools which he had at his disposal were
incomplete. For example, forecasting of revenues was hampered
by out-of-date information, Taxes were not being withheld on
a current basis and, therefore, revenue forecasts were based
on year-old income data. Less than one-sixth of expenditures
were free from relation to defense or veteran benefits and
this also rendered expenditures relatively inflexible as a
tool. Hoover's only effective expenditure cut could come from
iDewey, The Financial History, p. 536.
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aS0URCE: U. S. President, Economic Report of the President
,
1970 t (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing
Office, 1970), p. 249.
^SOURCE: U. S. Treasurer, Annual Report, 1968 , (Washington,
D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1969) » P. 6l
.
cNote: Budget Balances after Fiscal Year 1939 are based
on Consolidated Cash Statements,
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public work expenditures. 2 His proposal to cut public works
expenditures, which had been keyed to unemployment, by one-
half billion dollars, sealed the political fate of the
Republicans to an ensuing twenty year absence from executive
participation.
Although Hoover had been defeated by failing to
deliver his promised symbol, the "balanced budget," neither
the symbol nor the conceptual approach were to die an easy
death. It will be recalled that Alexander Hamilton's system
of sound finance had included three essential elements. These
elements were: (l) a priority of goals; (2) flexibility and
timing to changing conditions; and, (3) the use of appropriate
accepted symbols, 3 As noted previously, President Hoover had
accepted a goal of restoration of confidence without debt
creation, using the accepted symbol of a "balanced budget" with
attempted flexibility of tax and expenditure policy. The
Democrats and Republicans were united on "the symbol." Both
political parties promised annually-balanced budgets in the
elections of 1932. *" However, since the Republicans had not
delivered this symbol of sound finance, it became the job of
the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration to deliver at
2Swans on, Hamilton's Fiscal Policy
,
p. 82,
3stein, The Fiscal Revolution
,
p. 15.
^Porter, National Party Platforms, pp. 331-350.

least some version of the concept.
President Roosevelt pledged, in 1933i that he v;ould
cut expenditures to restore the public credit. However,
Roosevelt found it necessary to develop a dual approach to
budgeting. His application of only general expenditures to
the balanced budget role was a desperate attempt to deliver a
political promise before the election of 1936, and still effect
necessary relief. His initial impetus for exposing all
emergency programs to debt financing, in a special category
outside the symbolic budget structure, seemed to come from a
realization that a balanced budget, in total, was not even
remotely possible for fiscal year 193^ • Therefore, he related
his relief and reform program financing to the publicly
accepted "symbol" of permissable deficit financing in times
of a national emergency - to be paid off in time of prosperity.
5
However, the public had previously only accepted war as the
emergency which justified living outside of current means,
Roosevelt was creating an illusion on debt similar
to that used by Alexander Hamilton, in 1791. Roosevelt's
"implied balance" in general (non-emergency) expenditures gave
an illusion to non-creation of debt just as Hamilton's sinking
fund had given the impression of debt repayment. While
employing this concept, Roosevelt was committed to a contracted
5Kimmel, The Federal Budget, p. 178.

budget policy of economy for general expenditures and an
expansive budget policy for emergency programs to create
employment, Since it was a simple matter to shift projects
from one category to another, he, in effect, had no budget
policy.
Roosevelt's technique of providing temporary relief
funds and later expanded public works reform packages, created
substantial deficits in the overall Federal accounts. In the
first four years of Roosevelt's administration, the smallest
annual deficit incurred was 2.6 billion dollars and the national
debt increased from 22 billion dollars to nearly 36 t k billion
dollars (Table i|~l)
,
Roosevelt's initial policies were policies of
frustration and desperation. Although many major reform pro-
grams were unsuccessful, they were tied to major expenditure
decisions. However, President Roosevelt did forcefully
stabilize the international and domestic financial systems
early in 1933. Although his steps for stabilization of banking
and credit will not be discussed here, they were significant
in that Roosevelt never again had to fear for inability to
finance a deficit budget." Until 1938, Roosevelt's fiscal
emphasis consisted of temporary stop-gap measures to provide
direct relief, and relief through employment. He hoped, but
"Stein, The Fiscal Revolution, p. 5^.
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did not actually plan for, the stabilization of purchasing
power and a recovery of confidence.
In this respect, Roosevelt's programs were not basic
to any new economic theory during the period prior to 1938.
He did, however, call upon the new thinking in economic
theory to "explain away" the budget inbalances and the slow
response to recovery from his programs. He believed that the
key to recovery and restoration of purchasing power was
through changes in government expenditure rather than alteration
of the taxing structure. In fact, the changes he recommended
and implemented in taxation were upward revisions designed to
cause reform and only secondly to gain revenues.
Roosevelt, in explaining away the difference, came
to embrace and espouse the concept of the British economist,
John Maynard Keynes, relative to the "pump priming" aspects
of Federal expenditure policy. Economist George Terborgh
reflects that Roosevelt viewed the economy as a dry pump which
would react to temporary Federal deficit expenditure injections
in the income flow,' However, he did not come to accept the
view that expenditures should be consciously and deliberately
applied as a balancing factor to secure economic stabilization,
p
as Keynes had postulated,
7George Terborgh, The New Economics
,
(Washington:
Machinery and Allied Products Institute, 1968)
,
p. 4.




(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.~j 1936) ,
p. 220.

Roosevelt continued to cling to the hope that he
could deliver his campaign promise of 1932 to balance the
budget and reduce expenditures. He had consistently been able
to deliver the latter promise since his public forecasts of
expenditures for coming years had always been projected much
higher than what actually occurred - thus, giving the illusion
of reducing expenditures and reducing annual deficits. It
appeared that part of this approach was purposeful while the
other part was due to lack of proper statistics and inability
to implement on schedule the huge public works expenditure
programs which were approved. This policy of illusion appeared
so successful that it prompted hirn to say, as part of his
budget message, in 193°, that:
Our policy is succeeding. The figures prove it. Secure
in the knowledge that steadily decreasing deficits of
today will turn into increasing surpluses and that it
is the deficit of today which makes possible the surplus
of tomorrow. Let us pursue the course we have mapped.
9
Although this statement sounds much like the
"activist" economic order of President Kennedy, in 1962, as
related to taxation tools, Roosevelt was referring to the
"pump priming" consequences of deficit spending policy. Even
though Roosevelt was forced to take the economic analysis to
the polls in 1936 to "explain away" his recovery failures, he
still viewed balanced budgets as essential and expenditures as
9Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt , Vol. I,






stop-gap measures only. Economist Herbert Stein comments that
this marginal approach may well have contributed to the severe
limitation of recovery efforts, since these programs were
emphasized as relief rather than recovery measures and were
,
therefore, held to minimum scale. ^ In any event, the results
had given the illusion that a balanced budget was a close
reality.
President Roosevelt and the Democratic party were
to receive a mandate, in the elections of 1936 i despite the
Republican charges of expansive Federal activity, high taxes,
and fiscal irresponsibility - all of which were well in
evidence in terms of definitions of those days, Roosevelt
had promised the voters a balanced budget within a year or
two and this appeared valid within the framework of his
illusion of progress. However, the Republican presidential
candidate had only promised that balanced budgets were necessary
In spite of the five tax increases, which had taken place since
1933> this promised balance with a deadline appeared to give
the Democratic party an edge to overcome the record of deficits
in the election of 1936. 11 The Republicans lost any essential
voice in fiscal policy matters until the congressional election
of 19^6" resulted in a Republican majority in Congress.
The campaign of 1936 had forced Roosevelt to educate






himself and the public in areas of public finance which he
did not himself accept. He found himself defending a policy
of deficit spending on the basis of the income multiplier
effects. These reasons had previously been strange and dis-
agreeable to him. The next four years of his administration
were to confuse and shatter his traditional views regarding
the role of the budget in the economy. He had not really
believed what he said, in 1936, and clung to the view that
relief was the only valid reason for deficit spending.
A Quest For Survival
The recession of 1937-1938 was to awaken the adminis-
tration and Congress to a new Level of confusion. The deficit
had not been eliminated and recovery was not yet complete
when this sudden violent recession came about. Serious
questions were raised 'concerning the prospect that the economy
had reached it's highest level and further growth would be
impossible without continuous governmental intervention by
the means of ever-increasing deficit financing, Many believed
that the slow-down of governmental expenditures and increased
revenues, in 1936-1937 had caused the recession. -*-
For the first time, serious political questions were
raised concerning the government's responsibility for economic





becoming somewhat confused, continued to side with his
Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, in deference to
the economists and spending proponents within his administration.
Even as late as January, 1938, Roosevelt was aiming toward a
balanced budget. *
3
A large degree of Roosevelt's problems, regarding the
formulation of a positive fiscal policy, were in strictly
political considerations. On the one hand were proponents for
expansive governmental deficit spending to augment the income
flow, and on the other hand were the Republicans and an
increasing number of his own party demanding expenditures be
cut further so that a tax reduction could be effected.
Roosevelt had been able to experiment with temporary spending
and reform measures to alleviate President Hoover's depression.
In 1936» his political supporters were patient since the growth
trend was up (Table ^--2), However, now he was faced with his
own depression which demanded timely resolution and definable
tools.
Roosevelt's attempt to cut expenditures, in early
1938, was the last attempt any President would make of this
approach during a recessionary period. Stein states that:
. . .
it, in effect, became a national fiscal policy after
that time to never attempt an expenditure cut during
13Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 193 ^» (New York: Mac-
millan Co., 19^1), P. 8.
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aS0URCE: U. S. President, Economic Report of the President
,
1970 1 (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing-
office, 1970), pp. 177,191.
^Data selected to indicate shifts in growth trends and not




recessions . 1 !'
Although the national debt had risen from 22.5
billion, in 1933t to hO.h billion, in 1939 (Table 4-1), it
had lost forte as a determinant of fiscal policy. One reason
for this was that primary interest was focused on the level
of unemployment during the period, not the size of the national
debt. Two additional factors influenced the decline of the
"debt issue" prior to World War II. The first was the fact
that the Treasury had few problems financing deficit spending
without effecting the level of interest rates. ** The second
factor was that the introduction of trust funds with the reform
legislation of this decade had shifted the effects of ownership
of the debt. The trust funds were ready markets for treasury
securities to finance deficit spending. In other words , the
debt held by the public had actually declined during this
period of time while intra-governmental debt ownership took
up the slack. 1°
These changes, and the pressures from Congress,
caused Roosevelt to partially accept the new role of the govern-
ment as monitor of the economic stability of the nation.
l^Stein, The Fiscal Revolution
, p. 115.
15Henry C. Murphy, The National Debt in War and
Transition
,
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co."j Inc. , 1950) i
PP. 13-15.
l6u. S. President, Economic Report of the President
,





Manifestations of this shift in thinking were the establish-
ment of the Budget Bureau within the Executive office of the
President, in 1939, as opposed to being a staff office of the
Treasury Department. Increased emphasis on national objectives
such as a projected goal for national income was evident. 1?
Part of this shift was caused by conviction by Roosevelt,
but, the greater part was surely caused by his inability to
balance the budget or control the pressure on expenditures
for relief and other programs. He wanted to shield the
psychological effects of continuing deficits, Kis shift was
demonstrated in his budget message, in 1939, which stated,
in part:
We can and do fix the rate of taxation by lav:. We
cannot, by a simple legislative act, raise the level
of national income, but, our experience in the last
few years has amply demonstrated that through wise
fiscal policies and other acts of government, we can
do much to stimulate it.l°
Roosevelt's views were in part a reaction to past
failures and also a reflection of some morbid approaches to
economic theory. George Terborgh depicts one such approach
which felt that our economy had "matured" and that the
frontiers of private investment had diminished with the
exception of replacement of equipment. Therefore, the
17Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1939 , (New York: Mac-




government would be required to expand investment projects
with ever increasing Federal deficits. It was felt that the
"secular stagnation" of the economy would require continuous
governmental intervention to stimulate consumer spending. "
However, these views and those held by Roosevelt did not
receive a training ground. The emergence of a major world
war settled many theories and provoked new questions. In
addition, it provided solutions for Roosevelt's depression
of 1938i by closing the production gap, demanding full employ-
ment, and promoting fantastic growth (Table k-2).
A Forced Survival
Although there had been primary focus on purchasing
power, production, and ultimately national income, during the
decade of the Thirties, the emphasis soon came to rest on
mass unemployment. The tools for solving unemployment had
been backdoor approaches of temporary stimulation of relief
with the hope that the economy would automatically readjust
and eliminate the problem. The outbreak of the Second World
War added a new priority to the problem. The high percentage
of unemployed - 9 million workers, or 17 • 2 per cent of the
total labor force, made full employment a national goal. ^
19Terborgh, The New Economics
, pp. 5-6 •
20paul A. Strayer, Fiscal Policy and Politics
,
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 195^), p. 223.
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Political parties gave the subject of full employment their
entire attention. The reasons were obvious. First of all,
full employment was felt essential to the war effort. Secondly,
the public had begun to put this symbol as highest in priority
of election issues.
The nature of war itself, and the character of
totality of the Second World War, dictated a subjegation of
political in-fighting and a moritorium of the rebellious
congressional attitudes which had developed toward the executive
after the recession of 1937-1938. Congress was compelled to
grant third-term President Roosevelt almost dictatorial powers
on the domestic and international scene. Therefore, from
early 19^0, until well after the conclusion of the war, there
was little influence on the executive in the shaping of
national fiscal policy. The war gave Roosevelt and his advisors
a chance to test concepts out of necessity, and on a much
larger scale, which had not been called into use in any previous
emergency.
The impact of war preparation and the war on recovery
and government finance was tremendous. Gross national product
and national income rose rapidly in 19^-0-19^1 1 to levels which
had not been attained since 1929» and continued to rise each
year throughout the war period. Gross national product, in
1939» had been 90.5 billion dollars and rose to almost 212
billion dollars by 19*4-5 (Table 4-2).
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President Roosevelt used all the powers at his
command, including direct control of wages and prices to
control inflation and assist in financing the war. Taxes were
steadily increased and although his attempts to finance the
war in a current fashion were admirable, more than 55 Pe^ cent
had to be deficit-financed. x The revenues obtained by deficit
financing were, once again, of a dimension not dreamed possible.
The national debt rose from a level of 40.4 billion dollars in
1939, to 269.4 billion dollars by the end of fiscal year 1946
(Table 4-1)
.
The government's direct control of the economy and
the dimensions of finance involved led to early thinking
concerning the proper conduct for post-war economy. During
the war, it was evident that over 50 per cent of all production
was directed to the war effort through the vehicle of govern-
ment contracts. This fact, plus the direct controls, made
the public look more and more naturally to the government -
in this case, the executive - for responsible policy for
continued growth and stability. The mere size of the growing
national debt negated much positive thinking regarding re-
payment in the near future or at least not within the "living
generation" thesis adhered to in earlier history. The success
of wage and price controls, during the war, gave renewed
emphasis to the thesis that post-war stability must be assured
21 Murphy, National Debt, p. 254.
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by the government. It was knox-m that controls would end
after the war and that the primary tools for stability would
revert to the only other tools which had been recognized -
tax and expenditure policy.
Concern for post-war conditions had been a primary
interest of both major political parties during the war and
were the key issues in the campaign of l^hk
,
Vivid memories
of the post-xvar inflations and recessions of the previous wars,
coupled with the unemployment resulting from the recession of
1937-1938, and the foreboding size of national debt demanded a
concise post-war fiscal plan. The fear of unemployment, due to
a sharp drop in defense expenditures and the return of employ-
able servicemen, also caused consternation. The public had
become accustomed to prosperity, jobs, and grox*7th and political
factions knew they would have to deliver something to represent
a commitment.
A Plan For Survival
The result of concern for post-x^ar economy stability
was demonstrated by many means. However, the first significant
indication of concern was passage of the Employment Act of
19^6. While the law, as passed, was a filtered version of
the idealistic approach which x^as originally proposed regarding
guaranteed employment, it did represent tangible indication




of new economic objectives. It provided a national goal of
maintaining growth and stability and established Federal
responsibility to assure pursuit of policy to accomplish this
end. In effect, it demanded implementation of programs to
insure maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.
It established a mechanism within the Executive Branch, the
Council of Economic Advisors, and within Congress, the Joint
Committee on the Economic Report.
It will not be the intention of the author to
discuss the apparent deficiencies of the act or the mechanisms
set up to implement the policies mentioned. However, it is
significant to note that one of the main objections to passage
of the Act is very germane to the economic situation which
actually evolved late in the decade of the Sixties. Stein
depicts this objection as one which:
, . . came from people who feared they would commit the
government to pursuit of a goal so absolute that it
might only be achieveable with inflation or price-wage
controls or both. This fear reflected awareness of . . „
the possibility that with a very low level of unemploy-
ment, and especially if the government were committed
to maintain it, uncontrollable wage and price determination
might lead to continuous inflation. ^3
Acceptance of the new national goal of stability and
growth did not seal the fate of balanced budget concepts or
reduction of the national debt. There were attempts to re-
define a balanced budget as a budget balanced at full employment
- with full employment generally meaning about 96 per cent of
2 3stein, The Fiscal Revolution, p. 200.
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the labor force. However, balanced budgets retained their
traditional definition by subsequent administrations. Debt
retirement likewise received attention and had not died as a
political issue. Most of the concern was centered around
excess annual debt reduction in the use of compensatory
fiscal policy. In other words, generations of surpluses too
high during an inflation could suppress consumer disposal
income to such a level as to create excess deflationary
tendencies and trigger a recession.
As stated previously, the New Deal policies of
President Roosevelt emphasized the fluctuation of the expendi-
ture side of the fiscal equation to alleviate excessive swings
in the economy. Likewise, President Truman emphasized the use
of spending tools vice taxation adjustment to achieve stability.
However, during the war, there had been little opportunity for
Roosevelt to adjust for inflationary tendencies by expenditure
policy since almost all expenditures were war- induced. He did,
however, adjust taxes to maximum levels and used direct controls
as tools of stabilization. Therefore, some experimentation had
been accomplished with fluctuations on the revenue side of the
equation during a period of rising national income. Also,
President Hoover had claimed, during his administration, that
the tax cuts of the decade of the Twenties had influenced the
fantastic growth in the economy.^
2Z|Kimmel, The Federal Budget, p. 1^7.
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In 19^7 i the Republicans, in control of Congress for
the first time since Hoover's administration, while not dis-
agreeing with President Truman that a surplus was desirable
during the post-war inflation, did disagree with Truman's
approach to the surplus equation. They proposed a cut in
expenditures and taxes, 2 -5 Their contention was the same as
in 1937-1933, that taxes were oppressive and while debt
reduction and surpluses were desirable, commensurate cuts in
taxes and expenditures would produce the same result.
However, President Truman, fearing a deficit in
fiscal year 19^-8, and not fully aware of the effects of inflation
on expected revenues, resisted and vetoed attempts at a tax
cut. 2" The Republicans were finally successful in passing a
large tax reduction bill over the Presidents veto, in February
of 19*4-8. The timing of the tax cut, although not really known
to either party, had been made at a most opportune time.
The peak of post-war demand was to taper off late in
19^8, into a recession (Table *J—2). The tax cut earlier in the
year had, inadvertantly, tempered the recessionary tendency.
This does not dismiss the fact that the passage of the tax
reduction appeared to be an indication of strict political
motivation and fiscal irresponsibility by the Republicans,
2 5stein, The Fiscal Revolution
,
p. 209.
2 6lJ. S. President, Public Papers of the President
,




Political reward was not evident, however, as President
Truman was reelected under the banner of balanced budgets
and disclaim of the "rich man's tax bill." Stein comments
that:
. . . Truman's victory on this issue raised uncertainty
about the political value of being an author of a tax
cut. 27
This uncertainty was later to inhibit acceptance of revenue
adjustments as a valid tool for fiscal policy.
Therefore, the goals of stability and growth had
been accepted. The balanced budget was still a key issue but
could be partially explained away by the use of compensatory
fiscal policy. Although the Employment Act of 19^6 had not
defined the tools to implement the new national objectives,
the administration had accepted a trial marriage between
compensatory fiscal policy and balanced budgets as the correct
approach. Indeed this was one of the major problems with
achievement of stability. Stein points out that fiscal policy
was overburdened. He states that:
Fiscal policy was expected to stabilize aggregate
demand in the face of current inflation and a prospective
recession, while avoiding tax rates so high as to weaken
incentives seriously and keeping budgetary pressure on
expenditure decisions. ^°
Certain general assumptions had been made about the
nature of fiscal policy during the early post-war period which








permeated political decision-making. The assumptions indicate
that those who accepted fiscal policy as "the" tool, placed
it in a rather lofty sphere, Charles Cortez Abbott, in his
analysis of debt management, summarizes these assumptions as:
1. Fiscal policies cannot be neutral;
2. The government can have an integrated, consistent
fiscal policy;
3. Manipulative devices are known, understood, and
available; and,
k. The economy can be viewed in a mechanistic sense -
a machine that can be controlled. ^
9
This was a very optimistic view of a tool that even
today cannot fit the framework of Abbott's assumptions. How-
ever, failure to accept, integrate and understand fiscal
policy was not the sole reason for its burdensome state.
There was failure to even consider the use of monetary policy
as a supplement to budget policy. However, the Federal Reserve
Board had petitioned, from the end of the war until early in
1951 i for release from wartime controls and independence to
participate in market stability decisions on all monetary
spheres
.
Emancipation of Monetary Policy
During major wars, the Federal Reserve Board had
been routinely called upon to assist the Treasury in deficit
financing through, among other practices, guaranteed support
of the government bond market. This practice, which was
2 9Abbott, Management of the Federal Debt, pp. 1^0-1^1.
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again instituted during the Second World War, had not been
discontinued. During World War II, the freeze on interest
rates on government bonds had rendered monetary policy
ineffective as a stabilization weapon. The release of direct
controls in 19^-6, forced compensatory fiscal policy to be
recognized as the only tool available. Monetary policy was
committed to support the bond market and, therefore, could
not permit interest rates to fluctuate freely to check the
post-war inflation.
The Truman administration, intent with balancing
the budget and holding down expenditures after the war, was
concerned with the tremendous refinancing required on the
national debt and the increased, interest charges
.
3® Without
a Federal Reserve Board committment to support, the Treasury's
bond offering, interest rates would increase and the adminis-
tration might have difficulty in financing the roll-over of
the national debt. As a result, pressure by the Federal Reserve
Board for release from support of an easy money policy in the
long-term bond market went unheeded until late in 1950*
Finally, the impetus of a currently financed war effort, in a
semi-peacetime economy, caused such rapid inflation in mid-
1950 that the Federal Reserve Board made an open break with
the Treasury and the President. In the fall of 1950. they
30l4aurice W. Lee, Toward Economic Stability
,
(New





stated that their policy could no longer support a pegged
interest rate on long-term government bonds , 31
The issue had become a political power fight between
President Truman and Secretary of the Treasury, John Synder,
on the side of pegged rates and Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, Thomas McCabe, for independently determined rates.
However, Chairman McCabe was receiving increasing support from
Senator Paul Douglas (D. Illinois) on the subcommittee for
Monetary, Credit and Fiscal Policy in addition to full support
of the Republican minority. The issue was resolved with the
Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of March 3i 1951 »^ The Federal
Reserve Board had been released from Treasury domination and
was permitted to develop a total monetary policy for the first
time since the beginning of the Second World War. This accord
provided independence and identity to monetary policy as a
supplement to fiscal policy as a tool for stabilization.
Although the Fed's first concern was the orderliness of the
financial market, its primary goal became identified with the
goal for fiscal policy.
It should be noted that release of a second agency
to conduct policy towards stability increases the possibility
and gravity of error as well as fortifying the chance of success
31 James A. Maxwell, Fiscal Policy
,
(New York: Henry






through integration. Eliot Janeway, in analyzing the signifi-
cance of the 1951 decision to grant freedom to the Federal
Reserve Board, made the observation that this new found free-




The pertinence of the foregoing description of the
release of monetary policy demonstrated creation of a sharper
definition of responsibilities and an acceptance that fiscal
policy was only one of several means to promote stability.
Clifton Kreys and Olin Pugh commented to the effect that
although the freedom of the newly independent monetary policy
was hampered by the adoption of a treasury "bills only"
marketing policy until 196l, credit policies did, in fact,
have impact on stability. -^
The last years of the Truman administration found
the economy on a new plateau. Initial war mobilization demand
drew production internally. Subsequent initiation of the
Defense Support Program was to give a tremendous impetus to
import trade at the expense of further domestic inflation.
The nature of the war involvement found peaceful European
countries profiting from inflation and cutting deeply and
33Eliot Janeway, The Economics of Crises
,
(New York
Weybright and Talley, Inc., 1968), p. 233.
3^-stephen R. Chitwood, ed., Economic Policies for
National Strength
,
(Washington, D. C. : Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, 1968), pp. 80-86.
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permanently Into the United States trade balance. This inter-
national inflation was to add a new dimension to the arena
of stability. President Truman, while trying to directly
control the inflation on the domestic front, could not cope
with the overseas inflation caused by excessive internal
demand. He had failed to control inflation, as President
Johnson was to fail a decade later, in the midst of a limited
war which prompted economic forces beyond executive control.
President Truman left office in 1953» in the face of
a prospective staggering deficit (Table 4-1). He still firmly
believed in balanced budgets, but, no longer was convinced
that an annual balance was necessary. His last budget message
indicated his partial shifting .toward a cyclical budget balance
concept. He stated that the financial program of the Federal
government
:
. , . cannot be planned in terms of a single fiscal year.
It must be planned
, . .
not just for the ensuing year,
but for three and even four years ahead .... Budget
and fiscal policy are tools of national policy. As
such, they are the subject of controversy and evolution. 35
The period 1932-1952 , had witnessed a revolution of
thought concerning the role of the Federal government in a
free economy. It had seen the budget recognized somewhat by
default as a significant factor in the economy. It had seen
35u. S. President, Budget of the United States
Government, 195^ » (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing
Office, 1953), PP. M5^-M55-
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the New Deal reforms tested without New Deal fiscal policies.
Expenditure policy changes had been tested for impact and had
proven valid. Taxation adjustments had not been proposed or
effected sufficiently to be fully tested as fiscal tools.
The Second World War had projected budget and fiscal policy
into position for a meaningful role, The War had also expanded
the debt to such a degree as to make "debt existence" no longer
valid as a determinent of fiscal policy. Interest on the
debt and debt limitation remained an element of fiscal policy,
although not significant.
National policy commitments had been made and were
not yet fully understood - nor were the various tools of
implementation including fiscal and monetary policy. Definitions
of growth and stability with maximum employment were still
contested into the decade of the Seventies. The attempt to
conduct further reform through the "Fair Deal" and the advent
of a war which was not required as an economy stimulant forced
an inevitable and familar situation. The situation was a war-
time inflation, balanced budgets and fears of post-war recession.
Upon the scene came the Republicans, successful in
the Presidential election of 1952, for the first time since the
election of 1928. Once again their pledge was to ring familiar




... a balanced budget, reduced national debt, an
economic administration, a cut in taxes, and a plan
for combating inflation by encouraging the end to
controls . 3o
The following Chapter shall explain how fiscal policy
became a calculated "wait and see" policy during the Fifties,
and how the economy fared with the retreat to automatic
economy-induced stability. Truman's gift to President
Eisenhower was to be inflation at full employment economy.
President Eisenhower's gift to President Kennedy, ten years
later, was to be inflation at less than full employment economy.
The reasons are basic and are exposed in the following Chapter.




THE EISENHOWER YEARS - THE STRUGGLE FOR
AN AUTOMATIC FISCAL POLICY
The Framework
The Republicans were victorious in the presidential
and congressional elections of 195^» This election presumably
presented a mandate to President Eisenhower and to Congress,
The mandate was interperted by Eisenhower as authority to
practice fiscal orthodoxy. In other words , he meant to effect
a reduction in Federal spending and taxes which would deliver
a balanced budget and an end to the inflation associated with
Democratic administration of the previous twenty years.
Eisenhower has stated that:
I put myself on record as an enemy of inflation and
expressed conviction that excessive taxation would
destroy the iniative to excel.
After he assumed the office of President, he said:
There was no one among my immediate associates not
dedicated, in principle, to the proposition that both
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The issue of inflation was to "become the keynote of
the entire eight years of Eisenhower's Presidency. It will
become apparent later in this Chapter that the partisan tools
of fiscal policy of the early years of Republican leadership
became bi-partisan tools by the end of the decade. Eisenhower
would not deviate from his central theme of anti-inflation
policy at any cost. In fact, he was not seriously challenged
in his evaluation of inflationary tendencies until 1959. Even
this challenge was to go unheeded.
The previous Chapter examined the intense concern
for unemployment policy which surfaced during World War II and
became expressed as national policy by the Employment Act of
19^6, Maximum employment had not been a serious problem after
the war with the exception of the recession of 19^9» which
caused unemployment to rise to 6.9 per cent. Employment
recovery from this recession had been swift and unemployment
remained very low throughout the Korean War. Unemployment
bottomed out at 2.7 per cent in August of 1953t and had only
risen to 3 per cent by the end of 1953»
On the other hand, the purchasing power of the dollar
registered significant decline after the Second World War.
The consumer price index increased nearly ^-8 per cent in real
terms during the period 19^-5-1952. Therefore, the emphasis,
3u. S. President, Economic Report of the President
,





in 1952, on inflation in deference to unemployment, was
understandable. Eisenhower's plan to deal with the inflation
was by immediate recourse to balanced budgets. The Truman
administration had departed with What would amount to a 5.3
billion dollar deficit in fiscal year 1953 (Table 5-1).
Eisenhower intended to balance the budget with a rapid and
drastic decrease in defense expenditures associated with the
Korean War and with a slight extension of wartime taxes. Even
though the Republicans had come to office promising reduction
of taxes, Eisenhower indicated, in his first State of the
Union message, in February, 1953» that tax reduction would
receive a lower priority than either balanced budgets or
checking inflation.
5
The controversy of extension of the war taxes and
subsequent revenue policies was to become the key to evaluation
of the recessions which occurred during the Fifties, the key
to bi-partisan fiscal compromise, and eventually the key to
the new frontiers in fiscal policy which would evolve after
1962. It is pertinent to establish the forces and key concepts
of Eisenhower's fiscal policy formulation at this point.
In relation to the status of the economy, Eisenhower
had believed that Congress, the public, and the political
parties had been subverted by bad practice and false doctrine
5u. S. President, Fublic Papers of the President
,








































aSOURCE: U. S. President, Economic Report of the President,
1970, (Washington, D, C, : Government Printing
Office, 1970), p. 249.
^SOURCE: U. S. Treasurer, Annual Report, 1968
,
(Washington,
D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1969) » p. 6l.
cBased on Unified Budget Concept.
into the easy road of 'perpetual deficits and inflation. He
accepted the responsibility to retrain the public by example
of a sound budget policy even at the sacrifice of immediate
tax reductions. According to Herbert Stein, he did not believe
he had a "fetish" about a balanced budget, but rather that
others had a fetish for increasing spending and unbalanced
budgets. Eisenhower had come to embrace a principle of
automatic stabilizing budget policy with no intervention unless
"Stein, The Fiscal Revolution, p. 292.
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the required action could be initiated well in advance of a
shift in the economy. If the action which was proper could
not be determined and implemented well in advance, no action
was considered &. better remedy than untimely action. Economist
Walter Heller detailed four factors which had been influential
in the development of this consensus of fiscal policy of
relying on the automatic stabilizers in the economy. These
factors were
:
1. The expansion of the Federal budget to a size which
made automatic flexibility quantitatively important;
2. The shift of emphasis from secular stagnation to the
problem of cyclical fluctuations, a shift which gave
a higher priority to flexibility and reversibility
of policy;
3. The disappointing record of post-war forecasting
which seemed to undercut the foundation of dis-
cretionary policy; and,
h* The attraction of a budgetary policy based on auto-
maticity and marginal budget balancing as a pragmatic
middle ground on which a consensus of otherwise widely
divergent groups might be reached. '
Professor Arthur Burns (presently Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board) was summoned by Eisenhower in 1953 to
become Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers
Burns and conservative Secretary of the Treasury, George
Humphrey, were very influential in shaping Eisenhower's fiscal
policy. One of the key concepts which Burns contributed to
Eisenhower's thinking was the fact that current developments
7williara Kamovitch, ed. , The Federal Deficit -
Fiscal Imprudence or Policy Weapon? ! (Boston: D. C. Heath
and Company, 1965) i PP. 85-86.
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in economic fluctuations would be influential in shaping
future economic events. In other words, the seeds to a
recession were to be found in the prior prosperous period.
Unfortunately, this concept, coupled with a concern over the
validity of forecasts and inherent lags in tax and expenditure
policy changes, fostered a period of cautiousness and lack of
effective planning action. The only significant advance
planning, which was accomplished, related to stock-piling some
emergency public works projects supposedly ready for expendi-
ture in an emergency. However, the planned projects were small
in impact and could only have effected expenditure changes of
about 200 million dollars a year. 9 Therefore, Eisenhower
apparently had the tools available to deal with an emergency.
He was soon to be tested on that very score by the recession
of 1953-195^.
The Tax Conflict
The Republican Congress had assembled in Washington,
in early 1953» postulating immediate reduction of war taxes.
However, Eisenhower's principle of balance first and tax cuts
later prevailed. The excess-profits tax instituted for the
Korean War was due to expire on June 30 » 1953* Personal income
ostein, The Fiscal Revolution
,
p. 294.
^Wilfred Lewis, Jr., Federal Fiscal Policy in Post-
war Recessions, (Washington, D. C. : The Brookings Institution,
1962), p. 1.64.

tax rates were due to decline automatically as of January 1,
195^» Eisenhower, through a series of Congressional committee
power plays , was successful in extending the existing tax
structure until January 1, 195^t and gaining an indefinite
extension on the 52 per cent corporate tax rate which would
have decreased on April i, 195^» His primary reasons for
extension were inflation and deficit budget balances.
Both political parties were in favor of not only
tax reduction soon, but, also tax reform. The Republicans
were opting for a conservative pro-investment tax reform as
the key to continuous growth and reduction of deficits. The
Democrats alternative consisted of a program for reduction in
the lower income brackets to stimulate consumption expenditure
with short-range advantages. This difference remained a
deterrent to effective tax policy until a Democratic Presidency
succeeded in fullfilling both goals in the decade of the
Sixties
.
Although Eisenhower was to allow tax cuts to occur,
in 195^» with full knowledge that the budget would still be in
a deficit position, he was not accepting the concept of tax
reductions without expenditure reduction. Permanent expenditure
reductions in defense spending were already planned for late
1953» and were "in sight." However, Herbert Stein points out




that this political compromise on timing for the tax cuts
(i.e., postponement of a businessman's tax cut) indicated the
willingness of the conservatives in Congress to temporize with
the idea of budget balancing to present a better chance for
success of the type of tax cuts and reform they desired. It
also showed the high priority the administration gave to budget
balancing as a weapon against inflation, since they had been
willing to sacrifice scheduled tax reductions they valued most
to anti-inflation fiscal policy.
The First Test
The recession of 1953-195^-, was to be the first
opportunity for Eisenhower to test his fiscal policy. Since
the administration was committed to anti-inflation policy, it
had ordered drastic reductions in military expenditures in
the fall of 1953* There is widespread agreement that the
cause of the recession was the reduction of these expenditures.
The President himself acknowledged that:
• . . the contraction, in part, represented the efforts
of businessmen to reduce inventories and was aggravated
by a large reduction in military expenditures.^
Economist, Alvin H. Hansen, has written that:
The recession was due almost entirely to the drop in
government expenditures incident to a cessation of the
llStein, The Fiscal Revolution
, pp. 291-292.
1 2 U. S. President, Economic Report of the President
,





Korean conflict. The decline in government outlays
on goods and services in real terns amounted to 10.9
billion dollars. 13
In a Brookings Institute study, Bert G. Hickman concluded that:
. . .
the cutback in Federal expenditures was the major
deflationary force acting throughout the contraction. '*"
However, the commitment of the administration to combat inflation,
preserve a balanced budget, and step "lightly" prompted no
major discretionary fiscal action to be undertaken during the
recession.
Eisenhower made varied promises of positive action
against a recession. In November, 1953» he stated that:
. . .
when it becomes clear that the government has to
step in,
. . .
the full power ... of everything the
government has, will move in to see that there is no
widespread unemployment. 15
Robert Donovan portrays the admins tration as being ever watchful
of the economic indicators. Donovan saw "a striking picture of
a President and his government grappling with a vast complicated
economy. "1" Although unemployment rose to 5»8 Pe^ cent in
early 195^1 Eisenhower and CEA Chairman Burns were loath to
take any positive action since they expected a natural upturn
13Alvin K. Hansen, Economic Issues of the 1960's
,
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., I960), p. 1.46.
lZfBert G. Hickman, Growth and Stability of the Post-
war Economy
,
(Washington, D. C. : The Brookings Institution,
I960), p7 99.
I5u. S. President, Public Papers, 1953» P. 785.
1
"Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower, The Inside Story,
(New York: Harper & Co., Inc., 1956), p. 209.
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by early summer. Any attempts to curb the downturn in the
economy were largely structured changes which had been effected
prior to the start of the recession, or were part of the tax
reform package which was due to be submitted even if there
had been no recession.
Eisenhower considered maintaining confidence to be
the key to recovery and was, therefore, reluctant to make any
public sign which indicated he felt the situation to be an
emergency. Extensive tax reforms had been promised in early
1953 so that steps taken in this direction in early 195^ seemed
only a matter of course. However, the reform measures imple-
mented in 195^'- were of a nature to stimulate business enter-
prise: e.g., liberalized new investment depreciation allowances,
fuller treatment of R&D outlays as current expenses, and
partial tax credits for dividends recipients. The impact of
these reforms plus the excise tax cut and automatic tax cuts,
enacted in 195^» were to amount to a cumulative stimulative
decrease in tax to business and individuals during 195^ °f
nearly $6.1 billion. 1 ?
Herbert Stein has commented that the recession was
not severe enough to transgress an apparent "band of inaction"
and require strong action. 10 However, the administration was
1 1Arthur F. Burns, Prosperity Without Inflation
,
arden City, New York: Doubleday and Co.,~1958)i P« 32 .
l83tein, Fiscal Revolution, p. 299.
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to claim, in 1955? that the excise tax cut, along with tax
reform and monetary ease, and acceleration of planned fiscal
year 1955 expenditures were among the steps taken to stimulate
the economy. 19 However, according to economist Wilfred Lewis,
the effects of discretionary expenditure actions were signifi-
cant but too late to influence the timing of the upturn. He
comments further that these actions probably only contributed
to the strength of the recovery. ^
The recession had, in fact, been mild compared to
the recession of 19^9. A review of employment figures reveal
that unemployment had only reached as high as 6 per cent during
one month in 195^» as compared to eleven months during 19^9.
By the end of 195^i unemployment had dropped to S»5 pe** cent
and was to continue to fall rapidly. By the end of 1956, it
was only ^-,1 per cent, (Table' 5-2)
•
The administration felt that it had passed a con-
siderable test with success. Recovery from the first Republican
recession since 1929 had been swift. This recovery had been
effected with almost strict reliance on the effects of automatic
stabilizers in deference to discretionary fiscal policy.
Wilfred Lewis states that this reliance on the automatic
stabilizers of reduced income tax payments and increased
19u. S. President, Economic Report, 1955 t PP. 20,
69-71.
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aS0URCE: U. S. President, Economic Report of the Pres ident,
1970 1 (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing
Office, 1970), pp. 205 and 229.
bIndex based on 1957-1959=100 per cent.
transfer payments had been at the expense of budget balancing
but had not produced the inflationary pressures which many
associated with a discretionary policy. x The Republicans had
sacrificed some employment and some revenue to inflation.
Eisenhower's apparent full dependence on his economic
advisors for policy determination during this and later
periods may well expla.in his reluctance to develop a positive
plan. His CEA Chairman, Arthur Burns, expressed the reason
for the absense of an anti-recession strategy. He stated:
. . .
actions to curb the decline of economic activity
did not express the unfolding of any master plan in
21namovitch, Federal Deficit, pp. 132-133.
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which all of the details had been worked out in advance
and every contingency planned for. Not only is this
sort of theory practically impossible, but any attempt
to implement it could invite disaster. Mo two recessions
run the same course. A wise government will therefore
need flexibility in its approach .... It will not
entrust the nations fate to a categorical economic
forecast or to a rigid economic program. 22
The reluctance on the part of the administration to
plan or publicly acknowledge that a recession was evident was
the key to Democratic party success in the congressional
elections of 195^» As late as April, 195^i Eisenhower had
publicly stated that he was concerned with the widespread talk
of unemployment and was not considering any strong pump-
priming action unless it was absolutely necessary. 3 However,
the Democrats, while denouncing the Republicans for inaction,
had not proposed any positive recovery plan. One exception
might have been the attempt of Senator Paul Douglas (D. Illinois)
to solicit agreement to a policy of an immediate five billion
dollar tax cut. Nevertheless, the Democratic charge of inaction
and callousness to unemployment appeared to be a prime reason
for the shift in voter preference in the elections of 195^«
A statistical study conducted by James L. Sundquist appeared
to clarify the impact of the recession on voters. His statistics
supported his contention that:
22Burns, Prosperity Without Inflation
, p. 33*
2 3u. S. President, Public Papers of the President ,




The decisive swing in voter preference that resulted
in the restoration of Democratic control of Congress
occurred when the recession struck in the winter (of
1953) » a^d . , . the voters whose loyalties were then
switched remained on the Democratic side. 2^
The resultant Democratic control of Congress seemed
to contribute further to Eisenhower's fiscal inactivity during
the remainder of the decade. The divergent views regarding
tax reform and tax cuts would provide an initial stalemate on
any tax programs and would later develop into an open compromise
of inactivity. Eisenhower's attempts to control spending
during this period of increasing international and domestic
committments were also largely unsuccessful. Therefore, he
had virtually no effective control over either the taxation
or expenditure side of the fiscal decision model. His lack
of positive action during the recession of 1953-1 95^ i had
further convinced him that advance planning for positive
fiscal action was not proper or necessary in a vigorous economy.
He was soon to have his thesis examined as the recession of
1957-1958 developed.
The Decisive Test
Since Eisenhower was now enjoying the Republican
prosperity (from 1955-1957) » his major concern returned to
9k
^-^James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy
,





control of inflation. His resolve to deliver a balanced "budget
increased to the point where he began to define the balance as
including some provision for debt retirement. 2 5 In addition,
he was not requesting a balance, but a sizeable surplus.
Eisenhower was not successful in his goal of a surplus until
fiscal year 195& due to various pressures on increased spending
which were drastically cutting into the prosperity-induced rise
in revenues. The pressure on spending only increased his
resolve to build his fiscal program on a surplus concept. An
additional factor which contributed to Eisenhower's resolve
for a surplus was that the debt limit established by Congress
of 275 billion dollars was rapidly being approached. This
situation had developed previously in 1953 and. Congress had.
refused to grant an increase - demanding cuts in expenditures
as an alternative. Eisenhower's fear was that authority would
again be denied and that freedom in spending for defense
programs and anti-inflation debt management would be inhibited..
In fact, this did occur in 1957. 2 ^
Eisenhower still desired to deliver tax reduction.
Although he came to believe that this objective would be
approached only if he could generate a surplus sufficient to
2 5u. S. President, Public Papers of the Presiden t,
1956 i (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 195^)
•
p. 90.
26Robinson, National Debt Ceiling, pp. 38-^-6.
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offset any tax reduction and thereby not violate his balanced
budget. However, the pressure on spending did not permit
generation of any sizeable surpluses in 1956 and 1957 ("Fable
5-1 )c In addition, the inflationary tendencies which still
remained as reflected by a sharp rise in the consumer price
index in 1956-1957 (Table 5-2) precluded any serious effort to
propose tax reduction.
The recession of 1957-1958 was sharp and short lived
based on its impact on production. Unemployment rose sharply.
In April, 1958, unemployment peaked at 7.5 P er cent and fell
only to 6.8 per cent by the end of 1958 (Table 5-2), Eisenhower's
reaction was a reflection of lessons learned from the earlier
recession. He felt the economy, was vigorous and sound and
would respond as before without any of what he had earlier
termed "slam-bang emergency programs." He felt that a cool
appraisal of the situation was required so as not to destroy
the public confidence.
Eisenhower's reluctance to "tinker" with the economy
was reflected in a news conference he held in February, 1958.
In response to a question regarding the possibility of an
emergency tax cut, he reflected that such a tax cut would have
a stimulating effect on the economy, but, he added:
. . .
this is something you can take hold of, and going
too far with trying to fool with the economy, then you
can get something else started. And you just remember

. . .
how v.re were always talking about inflation and
things we were trying to study. ^7
Eisenhower had indeed reached a peculiar situation. Ke had
thought of recessions and inflation as opposite poles. However,
the inflationary tendencies persisted throughout the recession.
The consumer price index rose an additional 2.7 points (Table
5-2), in 1958, more than the total rise had been from January,
1952 until December of 1956.
The President's policy of inaction was not going
unnoticed. Extensive pressure for increased expenditures and
lowered taxes was evident on many fronts 9 even within his own
party. However, neither proposal was consistent with
Eisenhower's desire to prevent deficits and check inflation.
To compound the problem, both the Democrats and Republicans
were fearful of loosing the political initiative on a tax cut
proposal. However, the conflict of proper tax cutting on
either the investment side or the consumption side had not
yet been resolved.
The solution to taxation policy was reached by a
party leadership moratorium on tax cuts, sort of a bi-partisan
compromise for inactivity. This agreement for prior consultation
between House Speaker Sam Rayburn, Senate Majority Leader
2 ?U. S. President, Public Papers of the President ,




Lyndon Johnson, and Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson
effectively killed the use of tax policy as a discretionary
fiscal policy device to effect recovery until 1962. 2 ^
Expenditure policy was called upon to increase spending,
but, similar to taxation, the administration had no ready plan
for implementation. Expenditure policy actually implemented
only increased spending by an annual rate of 1.1 billion
dollars by the end of 1958 and appeared little better than a
on
side show action. ^ J
What Level of Prosperity?
The economy leveled off quickly into recovery in the
spring of 1958. The recession had .been brief and Eisenhower
was quick to note that "the storm was over." 30 However,
Eisenhower's "storm" was economic decline and not the state
of the economy or the current state of unemployment. The high
unemployment still evident at the time of the congressional
election of 1958 appeared to shift voter preference and restored
even greater majorities to the Democratic party in Congress.
Both Eisenhower and others later rated unemployment as a major
factor in the Republican losses in 1958. 31
? 8 ibid. f p. 29^.
2 9Lewis, Fiscal Policy
,
p. 232.
30Dwight David Eisenhower, Waging Peace , (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & Co
.
, 1965), p. 310.
31Sundquist, Politics and Power, pp. ^5^-^62.

86
The assumed return of recovery, the prospect of a
deficit year, and continued inflationary pressures caused
Eisenhower to return to a stricter fiscal orthodoxy than even
before the recession. He feared further inflationary pressures
such as those which followed the recession of 1953-195^. How-
ever, he discounted the effect the Federal Reserve Board could
have by employing restraint in mid-1958. Experience with lack
of restraint after the 1953-195^ recession had been admitted
by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Martin to have been a
significant cause of the inflation from 1955-1957.
^
2 ''
Eisenhower later acknowledged that some of his
advisors had warned against an early return to surplus budget
policy. However, he contended that in addition to his fears
of inflation, he was concerned with the rapidly deteriorating
balance of payments situation. 33 Eisenhower's director of the
Bureau of the Budget, "Maurice Stans, reflected somewhat of the
intensity of Eisenhower's frustration with deficits. Stans
reflected that the compensatory theory of Federal spending
had not been successful and would never be successful unless
spending was held in check. He further stated that the highest
principle should always be annually balanced budgets except
in time of national emergency. Emergency created deficits,
32u. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance,
Investigations of the Financial Condition of the United States ,
85th Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, D. C. : Government
Printing Office, 1957), P. 1305.
33Eisenhower , Waging Peace, p. 385.
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such as that which occurred in fiscal year 1959, should be
followed "by surplus years . 3^
Congress had been educated, at least in the dangers
of Eisenhower's policy of surplus policy and consideration of
a balanced budget as a neutral device e Economist Harold M.
Somers had delivered a stinging indictment to the congressional
subcommittee on fiscal policy, in 1957 t on the falacious
interpretation of balanced budgets. 35 However, these hearings
and subsequent hearings should not be construed to mean that
Congress was a.gainst the President's plan for a stabilizing
budget which would show a sizeable surplus. Indeed, even
though the administration did not recognize that there was a
difference between the levels of prosperity in 1953-1 957 i and
1959-1960, Herbert Stein comments that the congressional
studies conducted during the period of the recession and
recovery found the Joint Economic Committee also a leading
advocate of big surpluses and easy money policies, 3°
Eisenhower's last attempts of using an automatic
fiscal policy saw resort to the age-old fears of debt and the
3^Maurice H. Stans , "The Need for Balanced Federal
Budgets , " Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science
, 1959, pp." 112-115.
35u. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Sub-
committee on Fiscal Policy, Federal Expenditure Policy For
Economic Growth and Stability^ 85th Congress, 1st Session,
(Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1957).
pp. M2-M9.
3^stein, Fiscal Revolution, p. 3^3.
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burden of future debt and deficits. He felt he had reason
for alarm as the highest peacetime deficit in history of
nearly 12.9 billion dollars had occurred in fiscal year 1959
(Table 5-1). He had returned to arguments of the fiscal
integrity of nations. He felt that a surplus vras as applicable
for fiscal year 19^0 as it had been for fiscal years 1956 and
1957 and that it had the same meaning. He failed to yield to
the arguments of Vice-President Nixon and others for a tax
cut to stimulate growth and reduce unemployment. He began to




Eisenhower's continued concern was for long-range
benefits. He disliked, but accepted, the short-range costs of
unemployment and slow growth. And indeed, the costs were to
be high. Unemployment was still at 5«5 P G ^ cent at the end of
election year i960 (Table 5-2), Eisenhower had failed to
recognize that inflation had actually been checked and reversed
during 1959. These negative factors were reinforced by another
small recession in i960 which reached its worst proportions
near election time. 38 Jobless rolls increased by over ^50 1 000
persons in October, i960 alone, and appeared to fortify




38Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises , (Garden City,




economic growth policies. This factor appeared to be enough
to return the Democrats to control trie Executive Branch of
the government. -> >
The Republican party appeared to pay the ultimate
electoral price as the cost of Eisenhower's programs. The
value to be placed on unemployment would not be questioned
again vis-a-vis inflation until the Executive Branch returned
to Republican control in the election of 1968. The policies
followed during Eisenhower's years sealed a death note to
impartial observation and automaticity and signalled birth
of fiscal activism. The determinants of fiscal policy would
not be changed. However, the relative priorities would be
changed and the lessons learned, from Eisenhower's fiscal
policy would be reinterperted. The Republican party would
acknowledge that it had provided a testing ground to the
Democratic party policy of the 1960's.
39Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy
,
(New York: Harper
and Row, 1965) » P. 2 17.

CHAPTER VI
FISCAL ACTIVISM TO FISCAL SOBRIETY
The decade of the Sixties was to become the real
test and evaluation period for an active executive fiscal
policy. In 1966, economist Walter Keller, President Kennedy's
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, was to reflect:
Economics has come of age
. . .
two Presidents have
recognized and drawn on modern economics as a source
of national strength and Presidential power. Their
willingness to use, for the first time, the full range
of modern economic tools underlies the unbroken United
States expansion since early 1961 - an expansion that
in its first five years created over seven million jobs,
doubled profits, increased the nation's real output by
a third and closed the
. . .
production gap which
plagued the American economy in 1961.1
Heller was referring to official acceptance of the
concepts of "new economics" which developed from the wri tings
of John Maynard Keynes in 1936. 2 Keynes felt that the govern-
ment must approach the economy in the aggregate sense and
intervene as necessary to establish an equilibrium at full
employment of resources without sacrificing a free enterprise
system.
1Walter W. Heller, New Dimensions of Political
Economy
,
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., IncT^ 1967)
,
p. 1.




Republican party President, Richard II. Nixon
(1969- )i was to reflect on the same period that Heller had
referenced with additional comments on the record of the "new
economics" for the remainder of the decade. He stated, in his
Economic Report
,
on February 2, 1970:
For many years, the American people have been seeking,
through this government, the road to full employment with
stable prices,
In the first half of the 1960's, we did have price
stability - but unemployment averaged 5t5 P er cent of the
civilian labor force.
In the second half of the decade, we did have relatively
full employment - but with sharply rising prices.
After five years of sustained unemployment, followed
by five years of sustained inflation, some have concluded




I do not agree.
3
President Nixon was addressing the results of the new activist
fiscal policy in controlling unemployment - but not controlling
inflation. The case is not so simple as the following pages
will describe. However, the basic issue was again priority of
purpose. Both parties sought low unemployment and sustained
growth, but disagreed, on the cost and speed of attainment of
these goals.
President Nixon was not casting a vote for inactivity,
but a balanced and cautious approach. He remembered well the
cost of an absence of an active compensatory policy. In
I960, as Vice-President and Chairman of the Cabinet Committee
3u. S, President, Economic Report, 1970? P» 3»
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on Price Stability for Economic Growth, he haxl failed to
convince President Eisenhower to postpone a drive for a. "budget
surplus and rather to increase expenditure and avert the
recession of i960. The cost had been defeat in the Presidential
election of i960 for candidate Nixon.
Grooming an Activist
The elections of i960 had not provided President John
F. Kennedy with a popular mandate. His plurality margin was
less than 1 per cent. -5 The basic difference in campaign fiscal
policy had not been the issue of a surplus, or balanced budget,
but, rather, a policy of easy versus tight monetary policy.
Both political parties believed that surplus years were
required to check inflation. However, Kennedy wanted increased
spending within the balanced budget and loose money to stimulate
investment.
President Kennedy's first appraisal of the economy




. seven months of recession, three and one half years
of slack, seven years of diminished economic growth
. . .
recovery from the 1958 recession . . . never
complete
. . .
unemployment never returned to normal
^Nixon, Six Crises
, p. 310.




levels .... This administration does not intend
to stand helplessly by
. .
.6
However, President Kennedy proposed no new plans or tools,
His economic policy resembled that of President Eisenhower,
during the 1953-1 95^ recession. He took a grim view of the
situation, but only promised new recovery proposals if still
needed in seventy-five days.? This sounded like a policy of
waiting to see if something would turn up. According to
Theodore Sorensen, by late spring Kennedy had convinced him-
self that no action was necessary - and he took none.
President Kennedy's initial similarity with previous
conservative policy thinking became apparent in his address to




should-, apart from any threat
to national security, be in balance over the years of a
business cycle, running a. deficit in years of recession
when revenues decline , . . and running a surplus in
years of prosperity, thus curbing inflation, reducing
the public debt and freeing funds for private investment,
9
Although Kennedy appeared to embrace the traditional
views of government finance, he was to find this narrow
definition of fiscal responsibility was impossible to integrate










9john W, Gardner, ed. , To Turn The Tide
,
(New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 99.
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with his other values. Increased international pressures,
culminating in the Berlin Crisis of 196l, in addition to
internal cabinet pressure for increased expenditures, forced
Kennedy to decide on 8. tax increase, or acceptance of a
deficit for fiscal year 1962. The Council of Economic Advisers,
headed by Walter Heller, and two other "new economics school"
economists, James Tobin and Kermit Gordon, prevailed on
Kennedy to forego a $3 billion tax increase. 1° He accepted this
route only with a firm pledge for a balanced budget for fiscal
year 196 3.
Republican policy had not changed. Their leaders
remained fixed on the target of balanced or surplus budgets.
However, conservative thought was in favor of a tax cut to
stimulate investment - within the framework of a balanced
budget. Therefore, the only route to a tax cut would be to
cut expenditures. Even though a coalition of minority
Republican and Southern Democrats were able to stall many of
Kennedy's "New Frontier" programs, pressures in defense forced
expenditures to continue to rise.
Prior to June, 1962, Kennedy did not look to a tax
cut as the key to growth, Herbert Stein summarizes Kennedy's
economics during his first eighteen months as:
. . .
increased expenditures for defense and for public
services, financed within a budget which would be
balanced
. . .
out of growing yield of the existing
10Heller, New Dimensions, p. 32.
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tax system plus higher taxes if necessary, and monetary
expansion to keep the economy operating close to its
potential.
H
Stein points out the "basic differences between the Kennedy
economists and President Eisenhower's economic advisors. He
states that Kennedy's advisors were
:
1, less concerned with the problem of inflation;
2, prepared to intervene in the market mechanism
with measures other than fiscal and monetary
policy, if necessary; and,
3, highly confident in their ability to forecast
economic fluctuations accurately and adopt
fiscal policy to achieve stability within a
narrow range. 12
All of these concepts were alien to conservative thought
regarding the lack of flexibility and responsiveness of fiscal
policy. The basic premise of reliance on the automatic
stabilizers and natural market mechanisms had been proposed
by the Committee for Economic Development in 19^7* and
religiously followed by President Eisenhower, especially in
his last two years as President. 13
President Kennedy also leaned initially to the con-
servative side. However, his Council of Economic Advisers,




13committee for Economic Development, Taxes and
the Budget; A Program for Prosperity in a Free Economy ,




along with such noted economists as Paul Sarauelson of KIT, and
Seymour Harris of Harvard, pursued an "education campaign" on
the President and others regarding the fallacy of accepting
the concept of balanced budgets without consideration of a
full employment budget. As Theodore Sorensen describes it,
the Council kept the President:
. . .
buried under a tide of memoranda. They become
the most highly influential and frequently consulted
Council of Economic Advisors in history. 1*
Seymour Harris relates that although Kennedy had an
analytical mind and because of his relative youth had not
developed a strong committment to traditional finance, his
conversion to the principles of new economics was to take nearly
two years, 15 Pressures for increased spending and the still-
present deficit were to make him reluctant to accept the
political and economic gamble of a tax cut as a stimulant.
President Kennedy had promised a balanced budget for fiscal
year 1963* However, the economic recovery faltered in Hay,
1962. This factor, with spending pressures still evident,




15seymour H, Harris, The Economics of the Kennedy
Years
,
(New York: Harper and Row, 1965"), pp. 2^-27.









Walter Heller and Herbert Stein relate the significant
developments on the conversion of the President to be the
following:
1. The President's famous Yale speech, in June, 1962,
Which attacked the "myths" of inflations created
by deficits, recessions caused by spending, and
debts as immoral burdens on our grandchildren;
2. Kennedy's press announcement on June 7, 1962 of
future extensive tax reform with net tax reductions;
and
,
3. The popular reception of the President's speech to
the conservative Economic Club of New York, when
the President gave the first public explanation of
why tax reduction was the key to growth and full
employment. 17
The President's conversion had not been without
apparent compromise to the symbols of "sound finance." Kennedy's
speech to the Economic Club of New York held out the tax cut
as the surest route to "budget balancing," while providing
"incentives" and "reductions in non-defense spending. "1° These
symbols had been basic to Republicans and conservative thought
from the time of President Hoover and Secretary of the
Treasurer, Andrew Mellon, in the 1920 •s. The President's
necessity to continue, in the Hamiltonian approach, was
succinctly described by Norton Long as:
^Heller, Hew Dimensions
, pp. 33-^8; and, Stein,
The Fiscal Revolution
, pp. 407, 420."
I8public Papers, 1962, pp. 875-877.
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. . . the great pyschological asset of sailing under
the famil i ar colors • 1
9
The President attempted to circumvent the aversion
to the present deficit by categorizing deficits. He stated:
Our practical choice is not between a tax cut deficit
and a budgetary surplus. It is between two different
kinds of deficits: a chronic deficit of inertia, or
the unwanted result of inadequate revenues and a restricted
economy; or a temporary deficit of transition resulting
from a tax cut designed to boost the economy and achieve
... a future budget surplus. The first type of deficit
is a sign of waste and weakness. The second reflects an
investment in the future, 20
The Quest For Approval
The President, having been convinced that a fiscal
power play was the correct action, sent a tax cut bill to
Congress in January, 196 3. However, other key actors in the
play had not been convinced that a "quickie" tax cut was
necessary. Congressman Wilbur Mills (D. Arkansas), Chairman
of the powerful House Ways and Means Committee, was more
interested in structural tax reform and closing revenue loop-
holes than tax reduction. He was aware that the Revenue Act
of 1962 had provided tax incentives to business investment
worth over 2 billion dollars annually. In addition, inflation
had been held in check as indicated by the stable wholesale
l9Norton E. Long, The Polity
,
(Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1962), p. 99.
20Public Papers, 1962, p. 880,

99
price index, and unemployment had leveled off at 5.5 per
cent. x The signs available did not seen to indicate the
need for massive tax-cutting measures. However, Theodore
Sorensen reflects that:
Slowly, the President brought him around. Initially,
Mills agreed to a major tax reform bill with a little
tax reduction to help it along. When presented, it was
a tax reform and tax reduction bill. In testimony, it
became a tax reduction and tax reform bill. And, when
reported out by Mills, the President had his major tax
cut with a little tax reform. ^2
However, flexibility of fiscal policy was not in
evidence. It took the House of Representatives nine months
to pass the measure. Forty-eight Republicans deserted the
party leadership to vote for the cut. The Senate passed the
bill with minimum debate. Therefore, the Revenue Act of 196^




The Revenue Act of 196^ reflected some changes from
the President's original proposal. Due to its late passage,
the tax reduction was to be phased over two years, 196^-1965i
rather than the three years, 196 3- 1965 as originally proposed.
Corporate income taxes were reduced from 52 to ^-8 per cent
rather than k6 per cent, and margins on personal income tax
23-U. S. President, Economic Report of the President
,
1963* ( Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1963)
1
pp. X-XVII.
22Sorensen, Kennedy, p. h^2.
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were reduced to 14-70 per cent rather than 14-65 per cent.
The impact of the tax cut was $13 billion at an annual rate
with $10.6 billion accruing to individuals. In addition, the
base withholding rates, in 1964, were reduced in o2ie stage
from 18 to 14 per cent even though the effective tax in 1964
remained at l6 per cent. This change had significant impact
on an immediate increase in consumer disposable income. Also,
since the difference in tax due would not be realized until
the spring of 1965i it had significant impact on the elections
in 1964, Louis Banks quotes from a study conducted by political
analyst Samuel Lubbell that the 1964 Lyndon Johnson Presidential
victory tended to read as:
... a plebiscite for the going economic system and
fears that
. . .
(the Republicans) might change it
.... If it (the economy) collapses, it will take
the Democratic party with it .... The proper role
for an opposition party ... is to make clear what is
going on and to advocate effective alternatives ,^3
It appeared that tremendous power had come to be
vested in the Presidency as it assumed a positive role in
forcing maximum employment and a target rate of growth with
minimal international monetary inbalance or domestic inflation.
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson's success in achieving the
goals of sustained growth and lower unemployment by 1965
tended to fix these objectives as political imperatives for
23Louis Banks, "The Economy Under New Management,"
Fortune t Vol. LXXI, No. 5., (Nay, 1965), P. 230.
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successive years. This fight for growth had come to be
accepted as an internal "war" in somewhat the same sense
that Franklin Roosevelt had required "total power" to combat
an external war in 19^0, Louis Banks has stated that Economist
Seymour Harris, in reference to the importance of the battle,
would recommend, if necessary, new and bolder risks of
executive power to maintain the objectives. He suggested such
means as
:
1, More teeth in the Presidential wage-price guidelines
which were in use from 1962-1965;
• 2, Acceptance of a 2 per cent annual inflation rate;
3. An end to Federal Reserve Board independence;
4. Stiff controls on international transactions; and,
5t If necessary, devaluation of the dollar. ^^
History has shown variations of all of these proposals
surfaced during the last years of President Johnson's adminis-
tration in attempts to promote growth without inflation.
However, before consideration is given to the dilemma of the
last five years of the decade, a review of economic changes,
which occurred during the period of passage of the Revenue Acts
of 1962 and 196^, and the Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965,
would be beneficial.
The record for 196l-1965i indicates that inflation
did not surface as a problem until late 1-965* The wholesale
price index remained stable until 196 5 an<3- ^a& onIy risen by




price index was likewise quite stable with an increase of
only 5»^ P e i" cent in five years. Unemployment, except for a
minor setback in 1963» had decreased steadily and averaged
only h,$ per cent during ±96$, Corporate income, a key to
investment, had taken a dramatic increase during 196'+ and
1965 and increased by over M per cent during the five years.
Gross national product had increased by 36 Pe^ cent. Tax
reduction had been effected arid although budgetary deficits
totaled over $22 billion during the period, Federal expenditures
were also up by over 27 per cent from 1961 (Table 6-1). "New
Frontier" and "Great Society" programs and strategy x-rere riding
the tide of victory - until an uncontrollable element, the
Vietnam War, was introduced into a supposedly fully controllable
environmental model
.
Tipping The S cales
The upsurge in total Federal outlays in late 1965.
due to escalation of the Vietnam War , coming as it did as the
economy was moving rapidly toward full employment, tipped the
balance of economic pressures toward inflation. The spending
practices which developed reduced allotted funds for President
Johnson*s "Great Society" programs, but, not enough to offset
increased defense spending. The economy entered an area of
excessive aggregate demand it had not witnessed since 1955*
Once again, questions of spending priorities and unemployment

TABLE 6-1
ECONOMIC DATA ( 1 961-1 965
)
a
SELECTED Year • Total


















(Per Cent) 6.7 5.5 5.7 5.2 4.5 - 2.Z%
Corporate Income
(After tax)
(# Billions) 27.2 31.2










- 3.4 - 7.1 - 4.7 - 5.9 - 1.6 -22.7
Federal
Expenditures
"71 Billions) 97.8 106.8 111.3 118.6 118.4 +27.2^
aS0URCE: U. S. President, Economic Report of the President
,
1970> (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office,
1970), pp. 177, 205, 229, 232, 249, 260.
^Not adjusted for price variance.




versus inflation were to surface.
Rapid Vietnam, spending increases, coupled with a
rapid rise in private spending, in late 1965 and early 1966,
of 2-3 billion dollars per quarter, achieved the unemployment
target of k per cent, which had been established by the Kennedy-
Johnson term. Therefore, a reevaluation of fiscal policy goals
was forced relative to further expansionary or deflationary
action. Lester Thurow, commenting on this period, stated that
President Johnson:
. . .
moved to a slightly more deflationary position by
increasing social security taxes $6 billion, by cancelling
$1 billion in scheduled excise tax reduction (the second
stage of the Excise Tax Act of I965) » by reducing incomes
$1,2 billion with a graduated withholding system for
individuals , and by reducing corporate income by $1
billion through cutting the time between
. . .
earnings
and tax payments, (Therefore) discretionary fiscal
action, at the beginning of 1966, increased the revenues
by almost $9 billion, but large expenditure increases
, . . (caused) the full employment surplus ... (to
fall) from $h billion to |3 billion in 1966, 2 5
Therefore, although President Johnson had been
successful in passing the Tax Adjustment Act of 1966, to
accomplish the "quickie" discretionary actions described above,
the large expenditures necessary for Vietnam and his own
unwillingness to postpone some Great Society programs, such
as expansion of Medicare, dictated that monetary policy would
be forced to assume the role of checking inflation. °
25chitwood, Economic Policies
, p. 117.








The Federal Reserve Board had already begun to act,
in late 1965» "by moving to raise bank discount rates. However,
With investment spending still strong, and fiscal policy
calling for accelerated income tax payments with resultant
credit demands, interest rates rose rapidly and credit rationing
threatened to brake the economy too sharply, • This was
already apparent in mid-1966, as the "credit crunch" was severly
effecting housing and other construction. Monetary ease did
not begin to show until the President, by gaining temporary
repeal of the investment tax credit of 7 per cent which had
been granted by the Revenue Act of 1962, checked investment
pressure late in 1966.2° However, expenditure pressures in
the Federal sector remained high in a virtually full employment
climate. These deficit expenditures caused severe cost
pressures in labor intensive markets with a resultant impact
on prices levels.
President Johnson, knowing that the trend of war
would increase deficits still further sent to Congress, in early
1967, a proposal for a 6 per cent income tax liability surtax.
He was attempting to use the flexible, timely-action fiscal
formula of the new economics to decrease the aggregate demand.
The surtax was to be effective on 1 July 1967, for a two year
2 7" Monetary Policy in the 1960's," Federal Reserve
Bulletin, (September, 1968), p. 71^.
28sconomic Report, 1968, p. 2 80.
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period or until after Vietnam War committments tapered off
if this occurred earlier. It v.rould be applicable to both
corporate and personal tax liability. However, Congress
appeared very reluctant to even hear of a tax increase in the
presence of a slowing economy.
In the summer of 19&7, with deficit spending expected
to reach all time proportions, private borrowers began to speed
up their credit demands in anticipation of future needs.
Therefore, although monetary policy since the "1966 crunch"
had been relatively easy, interest rates again soared to 1966
levels. 29 This forced a Johnson-Congress confrontation on the
need for a tax increase, only now the proposal was for a 10
per cent surtax since the originally proposed implementation
date had passed. In addition, the President wanted further
speedup of corporate tax collections and a further postpone-
ment of excise tax reductions . 30
Congress, although aware of the pending deficit in
the budget, was not receptive to the use of tax policy increases
for the purpose of "fine tuning" the economy. Once again,
Chairman Wilbur Mills, of the House Ways and Means Committee,
was to make a mockery of assumed executive power which was
attempting to develop a "flexible fiscal tool." Chairman Mills
29"Monetary Policy," p. 715.
3^u. S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means,
Hearings, Tax Proposals of the President, 1967 > 90th Congress,
1st Session, (Washington 1




finally forced Johnson to corapromJ.se, whereby a tax increase
could only be passed concurrent with his committment to reduce
expenditures. When finally passed, the Revenue and Expenditure
Control Act of 1968 would even have less than full year impact
on calendar year 1968 since the effective date for personal
income tax liability was 1 April 1968. In effect, this only
allowed a 7*5 Pe ^ cent surtax for that year.-**
The passage of the law provided proof that Congress
would allow fiscal activism in both directions, restraint and
expansion. However, even though the surtax did draw down
$10.5 billion at an annual rate from the income stream, the
results, by early 1969, were not as encouraging as had been
expected. 32 <phe effects of fiscal restraint applied by
President Johnson seemed late and disappointing. The attempt
to use active fiscal policy without proper flexibility had
resulted in an excessive inflationary spiral with pressure on
interest rates even during a period of monetary policy ease.
As depicted by President Johnson's Council of Economic Advisors,
upon departing office in January, 1969:
. . .
several elements of private demand showed unanticipated
strength. The sluggishness of consumer buying, in early
spring (1968), tended to be temporary and misleading.
Business investment began to move up sharply .... Home-
building rebounded
. .
. all elements amounted to an
3l Economic Report, 1968
, p. 85.
32 u. S. President, Economic Report of the Preside nt,




unprecedented "buoyancy in private demand and production. 33
The impact of the surtax was to continue to appear insignificant
as personal income and industrial output continued to rise in
the first quarter of 1969. Meanwhile, the reigns of the
Executive Branch of the government once more shifted back to
the Republican party.
Shi fting the Reins
The Republican party campaigned toward victory in
the presidential election of 1968 under many banners. The
banner of fiscal issues was "an economy in crises." The
presence of a rapid rate of inflation and high budget deficits
was well known to both major political parties. However,
President-elect Richard Nixon had read in these signs a call
for a return to the style of the old economics and in terms of
the old rhetoric-fiscal orthodoxy. He had sensed that public
confidence in the liberal tradition of the "New Deals" was at
a low ebb. 3 His prediction appeared valid after election day
results
.
The lack of significant impact of the Revenue and
Expenditure Control Act of 1968 by the end of calendar year
1968 was accepted by the Johnson administration in its
recommendations for 1969. President Nixon, in evaluating
53ibid
., p. ^5.
3^"Did Economics Lift GOP Hopes?," Business Week
,
(July 13, 1968), pp. 3^-35.
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those proposals and the past record, was to find that price
deterioration was severe and that the impetus of inflation
was great. The record of growth and price stability during
the period 1961-1965 had been impressive. However, the record
from 1965~1968 was bad and 1969 would experience further
deterioration before the trend was slowed. Table 6-2 depicts
average yearly gains for the period 196l-1965i a*id yearly
increases in various indicies from 1966-1969. The consumer
price index, wholesale price index, and the gross national
product deflator had averaged only small increases during each
year in the period from 1961-1965. However, expenditure
pressures forced a sharp increase in the price indicies during
1966. In 1967 j the mini-recession .caused by the "credit
crunch" of 1966, of excessive tight monetary policy, resulted
in a slight drop in growth trends. 35 All price indicators rose
sharply after 1966 to a point where during 1969 the consumer
price index averaged 5«^ per cent; had peaked at 6.9 per cent
in the second quarter and was still 5«7 per cent during the
fourth quarter. The rate of price increases, as measured by
the GMP price deflator, indicated a 5»2 per cent rise during
the second quarter of 1969 and had only subsided to ^-.7 per
cent by year-end? 36 These figures reflected the highest rates
35Albert E. Berger, "A Historical Analysis of the
Credit Crunch of 1966," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Lewis
Review, (September, 1969T, p. 30.
36T?conomic Report, 1970, p. 5^.

TABLE 6-2
ECONOMIC DATA (I96l-1969) a
SELECTED YEAR





index 1.1 2.9 2.8 4.2 5.4
-Wholesale
index
.5 3.3 .2 2.5 4.0
-GNP deflator 1.4 2.7 3.2 4.0 4.7
Unemployment









yearly change) 5.4 6.2 2.4 4.9 2.9
a5ource
:
U. S. President, Economic Report of the President
,
197p_, (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office,
1970), pp. 48-54, 183-260.




of inflation sines the Korean War.
Real growth, as reflected by the rise in GNP (Table
6-2) rose steadily during the first three years vrith the
exception of a minor setback in 196?. Unemployment remained
below the targeted figure of ^.0 per cent during the whole
period and did not show signs of weakening until late in 1969.
Corporate profits, however, plunged and showed the effects of
tax actions as well as cost pressures in labor intensive markets
in a scarce labor environment.
President Nixon had entered the White House with the
tremendous inflationary pressures indicated above. His plan
of attack would be different from the stop-go activist fiscal
policy which preceeded him. His challenge was clear. No
political incumbent would survive with the present inflation
rate or could afford to brake the economy too hard and cause
a recession. His emphasis was to be on stability rather than
growth.
President Nixon proposed a policy of "gradualism."
A firm fiscal and monetary policy of restraint, but with minimal
interference vrith market mechanisms. This meant high taxes,
Federal spending cuts and surplus budgets. Even though demand
was still high, he felt that the fiscal policies implemented
in late 1968 and early 1969i which would shift the budget
position by over &28 billion, and the monetary policy shift
in early 1969 would begin to show effect by mid-year. He firmly
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believed that the current inflation had been caused by monetary
ease and excessive budget deficits. President Johnson's
budget deficit for fiscal year 1968 had been $25.2 billion
(Table 6-3) • In addition, past Federal Reserve Board Chairman,
William M. Martin, Jr. , had admitted that a mistaken shift to
monetary ease in mid-1968, due to fear of excessive fiscal
restraint, had actually sabatoged the efforts of fiscal policy. 37
Therefore, the strategy would require a cooperative Federal
Reserve policy and Nixon was later to move to assist in this
development.
The President's policy, as reiterated in his Economic
Report in 1970, called for:
a stability of economic policy .. . . (as) a means to
an end ... of steady growth, predictable government
action in maintaining a sound economic climate, and
constant involvement of the people in setting their
own priorities .38
The administration set out with a game plan for
disinflation. The game plan included four distinct elements
or phases, Paul W. McCracken, Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisors, stated that these elements were:
1. to brake the rate of inflation;
2. to accept the fact that effects from fiscal and
monetary changes would be visible only after a lag
of time;
37"How Burns Will Change the Fed," Business Week ,
(October 25, 1969), p. 103.








ITEHb 1966 1967 1966 1969 1970 C 1971'
Budget Surplus
or Deficit (-) -3.8 -8.7 -25.2 3.2 1.5 1.3
Federal
Expenditures
(yearly change) 16.2 23.6 20.6 5.7 13.3 2.9
aS0URCE: U. S. President, Economic Report o f the President
,
1970, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,
1970), pp. 250-251,
^Based on Unified Budget concept.
cEstimated for fiscal year 1970-1971.
3, to determine a definite sequence of indicators which
would signal a change was required; and,
*K to influence and effect resumption of expansion and
growth, 39
The tools that the administration felt they need to implement
the game plan included the following:
1. various tax increases, including extension of the
surtax until 30 June 1970 (at a rate of 10 per cent
until 30 December 1969 and 5 per cent for the balance
of the period) , discontinuance of the 7 per cent
investment tax credit, and extension of excise taxes
beyond the scheduled repeal date of January 1, 1970;
39paul W. KcCracken, "The Game Plan of U. S. Economic
Policy," (Unpublished), Remarks prepared for delivery before
the Ottawa Political Economy Association, Ottawa, Canada,
February 2k, 1970, pp. 6-10.
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2. a surplus budget position for succeeding years;
3. a cooperative monetary policy; and,
4. absence of any direct interference using wage-
price guidelines or noral suasion. '^
The President sent his tax proposals to Congress on April
21, 1969. Once again executive fiscal policy was to demonstrate
lack of effective flexibility. Congress did not approve
extension of the surtax to December 30i 1969* until early in
August. Even the extension of the surtax for the first six
months of 1970, at 5 Pe^ cent, was not signed into law until
December 30, 1969 as part of the Tax Reform Act of 196 9. *n
the opinion of the Council of Economic Advisors, the long
debate by Congress was damaging to the anti-inflation fight.
They commented
:
Continual uncertainty about tax prospects, which raised
doubts about how determined the fight against inflation
was going to be, contributed to the persistence of
inflationary psychology throughout the year.^1
The President's drive for a surplus was successful
in fiscal year 1969 (Table 6-3). However, it appeared as if
the determination of Congress, to enact the tax cut-tax reform-
social security benefit bill, in late 1969, was making a hash
of fiscal policy. Proposals, counter-proposals, and Presidential
veto threats about proper revenue levels in November-December,







strong challenge to Presidential authority in
fiscal matters .... The contest destroyed any
semblance of order in fiscal policy and put increasing
burden on monetary policy to control inflation.^2
Although the President appeared to compromise on the
tax bill, in late December, and swallow the revenue loss, his
continued resolve to maintain a solid restraining fiscal
policy was evidenced by submission of a surplus budget for
fiscal year 1971. Even though the projected budget surplus
was small and has been called by many financial analysts a
"precarious balance," since it contemplated future congressional
actions, it recommended only a $2.9 billion, or about 1.5 per
cent, increase in Federal expenditures (Table 6-3) . ^ The
small rise in expenditures was essentially determined by the
December tax bill.
The future impact of the. Congress -President struggle
in November-December, ,1969i on fiscal policy, was addressed
by CEA member Herbert Stein. He stated that:
To avoid large shifts in the budget position, we shall
have to rely primarily on stabilizing the rate of growth
of expenditures so that it keeps pace, approximately,
with the growth in revenues from the existing tax system -
or as it will be after the legislation is enacted. ^'
In fact, many conservatives had gone along with the revenue
^"Farther than ever from Fiscal Policy," Business
Week
,
(December 13, 1969), p. 31.
^3Hobart Rowen, "Nixon's Budget: A Precarious
Balance," The Washington Post
,
(February 3t 1970), p. 1.
^"Tax Bill Could Handcuff Budget," Business Week
,
(December 7, 1969), PP. 12-13.
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cute in the bill since it would tend to hold down expenditures.
Liberals, on the other hand, were for tax cuts and increased
social security payments in view of 1970 election rewards and
because some believed, as they did in 1963* that tax cuts




The President did not follow the rough road of
restraint during 196 9 alone. After mid-July, the Federal
Reserve Board, responding to the absence of restraint indicators,
clamped down hard on money and credit expansion. The rate of
growth of the money supply, which had averaged 7.2 per cent in
1968, had previously been reduced to ^-.4 per cent during the
first six months of 1969. After mid-year, the growth of the
money supply was held virtually stable at a 0.6 per cent growth
rate, and averaged only 2.5 per cent for the entire year. 5
Indeed, part of the President's game plan had been to nurture
a monetary policy which would work in concert with fiscal
policy restraint.
Although the President recognized the traditional
independence of the Federal Reserve Board and monetary policy,
he knew the political consequences of untimely monetary policy
^Economic Report, 1970, p. 28.
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changes. In what appeared as part of a plan to influence the
movement of monetary policy, the President nominated Arthur
Burns, who had been ex-President Eisenhower ' s first CSA Chair-
man and was serving as one of Nixon's advisors, to succeed
to Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, effective in
February, 1970. By recommending, and eventually installing
Burns , Nixon had succeeded in placing the first economist in
that position. Also, he gained an ally who understood the
workings of fiscal policy and could recognize fiscal policy
shifts. Burns had concurred with Nixon's game plan that
stability of policy was paramount. He came out strongly
against "fine tuning" and advocated an even policy. After
nomination, Burns was quoted as saying:
I think that abrupt shifts by the Federal Reserve Board
have been too frequent in our nations history. Our
monetary authorities
. . .
need to learn how to fore-
cast better
. . .
(-or) recognize that occilatiops of
monetary policy may easily prove destabilizing. ^
It was obvious that the President was seeking to assure
congruence of action through his nomination.
The administration had attempted to "ride out" 19^9
with a policy of gradualism - the policy of concentrating on
monetary and fiscal policy restraint without using the
President's power, authority, or prestige for any kind of
^°
"How Burns Will Change the Fed," Busines s Week
,
(October 25, 1969), P. 104.
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voluntary guidelines. The road had been rough. Since some
signs of dampening inflation had not appeared until the fourth
quarter of 19^9* - one quarter later than expected - the
President had to resort to verbal assertion to business
organizations and threat of Presidential veto to Congress to
maintain a convincing policy posture. It was not until late
1969» and early 1970, that some insiders were to find faults
with "gradualism." Arthur Burns summarized this concern
before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, in late
December, 1969i "by saying:
I think our policy of gradualism has been sound and
correct. On the other hand, I think we made a mistake
with the executive establishment in talking so much
about it. Its one thing to pursue a gradualist policy;
it is another thing to tell everybody that is exactly




. . , apply (gradualism) very
thoughtfully and responsibly, and do very little talking. ^7
Defining the Policy
The year, 1959* had been a year of policy execution
and some reformulation for the Nixon administration. Results
had not been as swift as expected but began to surface during
the early months of 1970. The President, reflecting on lessons
learned during appraisal of the 1960's, stated:
1. We have acknowledged that the government is often
the cause of wide swings in the economy.
^7"Arthur Burns on Easier Credit . . . Business in
70," U. S. News and World Fieport, (January 12, 1970), p. 59.
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2. \-Je acknowledge human elements in economic affairs -
fear, confidence, habit - and that the economy
cannot "be managed mechanistically and will not
suspend its roles to accomodate political wishes,
3. We acknowledge that one-year planning levels lead
to almost as much confusion as no planning at all,
and that there is a need to create a public aware-
ness of long-range trends and the consequences for
future years of decisions taken now.
^
The 19?0's were to bring about a revised framework for fiscal
and monetary policy decisions. The presentation of the
Economic Report of the President, and comments by his advisors
regarding the effects of the tax bill and current expenditure
programs molded a "revised fiscal orthodoxy." The impact of
past Federal expenditure decisions, when coupled with known
state and local government demands, and private demands,
indicated that maximum output was over-subscribed for several
years. Future priorities for outputs should be originated
from the state government and private sector. Any Federal
spending or taxation decisions would require an analysis of
total competing demands, not just within the Federal sector.
The Council of Economic Advisors had made five-year-
projections of the national output and known national demands
with startling results. CEA member, Herbert Stein, commented
in a speech on February 2h t 1970:
The most startling fact that emerges is that the uses
of national output will exhaust the potential output
through 19?2, and almost exhaust it through 1975. And
this is on the extremely improbable assumption ... of
^Economic Report, 1970, p. 3.
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no new Federal programs or tax reduction through 1975. '^
In addition, Stein commented on the shortfall of
investment funds:
. . .
private savings alone will not "be sufficient to
finance the volume of housing construction called for
by the 1968 Housing Act, plus the private business
investment required to keep productivity growing at
a fast rate. Therefore, a budget surplus would be
required if these investment needs are to be met,
and the opportunity for increasing government
expenditures or cutting taxes is by that amount
lower. 50
The President, having taken moves to indicate the
serious implications of the future economic outlook, moved on
March 17. 1970 to a slight loosening of the reins of fiscal
policy. His motives appeared to be many and varied. First,
he recognized what appeared to "be valid signs that demand was
softening. Industrial output had fallen for seven consecutive
months. Annual unemployment rates, which had risen to 3»9
per cent in January, and h-,2 per cent in February, seemed to
indicate a trend. There were signs of softening in prices,
especially in the durable goods area and also indications of
a lower acceleration of the wholesale price index. 5 J- Second,
his move to assume a greater indirect role in monetary affairs
^Herbert Stein, (Unpublished), Remarks prepared for
delivery to the Investment Bankers Association, Washington,




51 Wall Street Journal, (March 30 , 1970), p. 1.
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seemed to assure him of some slackening in credit policy.
^
Third, he was under increasing pressure from congressional
Republicans to show signs of preventing a recession during an
election year. Later he was to receive a supposedly unanimous
Republican minority stand from the Joint Economic Committee,
which also stressed strong fears of recession, -53
The Chairman of the CEA, Paul W. McCracken, was to
comment on the administration policy of fiscal restraint and
its reception during testimony before the Joint Economic
Committee on February 16, 1970. He capsuled the situation
as follows
:
The course of action throughout this period (1969)
had been reasonably stable. Sentiment about these
policies, however, has been volitile - ranging from
initial skepticism about whether these policies would
remain, to skepticism about whether the policies would
have any effect even if they held, to eventual
skepticism now about whether with these policies we
can avoid a recession .... (The) objective has
remained unchanged ... to get the economy on a more
non- inflationary growth path. The strategy has been
to achieve more even handed policies which avoid
extremes , -5 ^
Although the President had, In response to pressure
52Robart Rowen, "Nixon To Assume Larger Role on







(March 26, 1970), p. G13.
5^Paul W. McCracken, (Unpublished), Remarks prepared
for delivery before the U. S. Congress, Joint Economic
Committee, Washington, D. C, February 16, 1970, p. 15.
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and other factors, moved to ease fiscal policy, the shift was
insignificant in actual dollars. President Nixon had ended
the freeze on Federally assisted state and local government
construction projects. However, lifting this freeze had only
increased actual Federal spending by $670 million in this area
to the end of fiscal year 1970. Therefore, the shift was
largely psychological. The President seemed aware that the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 would release over f>12 billion of
social security benefits annually starting 1 April 1970. Also,
the severe restriction on Federal spending during the last
half of 1969 would require release of the balance of programmed
fiscal year 1970 funds during the first six months of the year,
These expenditures would move the Federal budget into a
relatively balanced position during the first half of 1970.5-5
The President's partial shifting to a "looser reins
without spurs " policy was an indication of his apparent desire
to move toward phase three of his disinflationary game plan.
This movement continues to indicate a willingness to exercise
what appeared to be political and economic "brinksmanship.
"
His continued desire to promote even-handed policies in monetary
as well as fiscal areas underscores the seriousness of the
outlook. It appeared to be a recognition that the Mew Deal
55"Kixon Eases up on the Reins," Business Week
,
(March 21, 1970) , p. Zk.
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programs of the Democrats during the past forty years had
accelerated to a position that the nation could ill-afford.
The return to a policy of continual budget surpluses, or
return to a form of the "stabilizing budget policy" of the
late 1950's will continue to come under sharp attack by some
economists or other liberals for inhibiting growth. It will
also be difficult to implement on a continual basis since, as
CEA member, Stein, puts it, "The political process abhors a
surplus. "-5-1
The administration watchword of the 1970 's is
"stability" rather than growth. The President seeks a viable
fiscal policy and a cooperative and independent monetary policy
within the parameters bequeathed his administration by President
Johnson. He promotes a new fiscal federalism. The question
of priorities for national output must be determined by the
people and the states first, with the Federal government's
share and internal priority structure established in the frame-
work of total demand.
Whether the Nixon administration will persevere in
resisting increasing pressure by a Democratic Congress and
internal party pressure for activism policy in fiscal and
monetary matters should be apparent relatively soon. A great
5°"A Surplus to Generate More Capital," Business
Week, (March 1^, 1970), p. 107.
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deal of patience will be required during 1970-1971 by an
American people forced into an uncomfortable environment of
a little of two worlds, retraction with unemployment, and
inflation. Nixon's most difficult policy decisions remain.
The third phase of the game plan, of adjusting some policy in
advance, appears to be close to implementation. The fourth
and most difficult phase will be to, once again, promote
expansion "with dollar stability."
Whatever the result, this surely appears to be an
attempt to shift from what seemed to become an "uncontrollable
fiscal activism with liberal ends" to a Federal fiscal





John Maynard Keynes has commented:
Lenin is said to have declared that the best way to
destroy the Capitalist System was to debauch the
currency. By a continuing process of inflation,
governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved,
an important part of the wealth of their citizens
.... Lenin was certainly right. There is no
subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing
basis of society than to debauch the currency. The
process engages all the hidden forces of economic law
on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner
which not one man in a million is able to diagnose
.
The major concern of President George Washington and
his Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, in 1891 » was one
of restoring confidence in the value of the currency. The
first priority of the Nixon administration, 180 years later,
is again one of stability. Keynes reflection, concerning
inflation after World War I, was not unique to that period.
Hamilton was successful in the short span of one year, in
restoring confidence and credit. Obviously, the time and place
significance of the problem is different. President Nixon's
success or failure will determine domestic and international
1John Haynard Keynes , The Economic Consequences of






fortunes - political and otherwise, Nearly 180 years of
exposure to the problem of inflation seems to have made its
significance only more accute.
Alexander Hamilton had attempted to implement an
executive budget to develop a fiscalism of not only anticipating
future economic events, but determining them. However
,
Congressional jealousy of executive fiscal power prevented
the establishment of a national executive budget until 1921
and inhibited acceptance of its economic impact until after
19^0, Even this did not relieve congressional jealousy of
fiscal power as it continues to inhibit executive fiscalism
today.
Traditional fiscal policy dominated executive thinking
from the time of President Adams, in 1797 » until after 1930.
This orthodox policy called for minimum Federal expenditures,
annually balanced budgets (except in time of war), elimination
of debt, and low taxes. The presence of debt actually determined
executive fiscal policy in most instances. Debt reduction and
elimination was demanded and charted , Changes in expenditure
and taxation policy were reluctant reactions often determined
by time and place events, such as: decline in custom receipts;
popular demand for regulation; etc., rather than conscious
shifts of thought.
Analysis of the more conservative-minded Republican
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presidential policy indicates a reluctance, on the part of
all Presidents, with the possible exception of President
Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1908), to infringe on economic
freedom. They considered the price of continued freedom,
including economic freedom, to be a reduction of Federal
spending and taxes, and repudiated what they felt to be the
assumption of arbitrary powers by Democratic party Presidents,
Government activity x-jas traditional^ accepted as a burden,
consequently a balanced budget without interference in a
dynamiic self-regulatory economy was considered proper executive
policy. Until the 1930's, the balanced budget concept was
interperted to indicate a "neutral" position of government
in the economy.
After 1930, a major depression and two wars captipulted
the government's "take" of the "economic pie" and forced a
recognition of "a public sector," It also forced recognition
that fiscal policy could no longer be defined as merely
balanced budgets, but, in addition, would have to acknowledge
other social values, such as unemployment levels, production
levels, and purchasing power. The Second World War had
created a liberal executive with tremendous power and resources.
The conservative attempt, in the 1950's, to abstain from this
position met with only limited success.
From the depression on, executive fiscalism went
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through successive periods of confusion in search for a new
budget rule. Inability to balance the budget led first to
"pump priming" methods. In the late 1930*s, a recession gave
way to more or less continuous deficit financing under the
guise of combating "secular stagnation" of a "matured economy."
Post World War II policy drifted to acceptance of a blend of
discretionary fiscal policy and dependence on automatic
stabilizers to counter recessions. This stabilizing budget
concept implied a surplus budget at high employment and
accepted monetary policy as a partner in anti-recession
policy. This policy endured until 1962, with Republican
conservative thought eventually placing heavy emphasis on the
automatic aspect, and liberal thought emphasizing the dis-
cretionary aspect.
Executive fiscalism took a sharp turn in 1962, when
the fiscal activism of the new economics came to the fore-
front. This concept envisioned a strong executive with
flexible fiscal authority to respond to changing conditions
in a way designed to hold the economy on the full employment
path. The key to prosperity was felt to be growth, with low
unemployment and stability obvious by-products. This was the
epitome of executive fiscalism.
The growth of executive fiscalism had been slow,
but, prior to 1962, it had shown some semblance of order.
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This was, in part, due to the Republican and conservative
cautiousness. The desire, in 1962, to create a powerful
and responsive tool in the Presidency had relied on falacious
assumptions. The implied availability of discretionary fiscal
action, as frequently as desired, the reliance on economic
forecasts as a "base, the assumption of parallel monetary
policy, and the assumed significance of fiscal actions all
contributed to the fall of fiscal activism.
The failure of fiscal activism was fundamental to
the structure of American government. Economic failure had
come as a result of ommission rather than commission of fiscal
action, with the possible exception of the excise tax cut in
1965» Apart from the problem of "recognition" and "operational"
(response) time lags to fiscal policy, the administrative lag -
congressional reluctance to delegate fiscal authority to the
President - prevented success. It had been successful in
promoting growth and stability with decreased unemployment to
1965. However, after that time, by violating its own precepts
by creating a huge budget deficit, rather than a surplus, when
the economy was operating above full employment, it kindled
the fires of inflation with such severity as had not been
experienced for twenty-five years.
President Nixon's return to a stabilizing budget
policy is a sober reappraisal of the past. It appears to be
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a recognition that the balanced budget rule, not accepted by
fiscal activism, was at least a rule which provided a working
concept of what constituted the equilibrium between receipts
and expenditures. It was a crude rule, but it was definite.
It had worked well in the past and had injected a wholly
desirable fiscal discipline. Activism had not replaced the
rule with anything. It had usurped a rule deeply ingrained
in the structure of social and political thought. Fiscal
activism had not been understood and was foreign to the civil
conscience.
Returning to a type of fiscal orthodoxy is not just
acquiescence to the political structure, but an admission of
political realities in a democracy,. Activism, although valid
in theory, appears to have been an experiment noble in motive
but impossible in application. The political framework, the
practical difficulties of administration, the uncertainty of
economic events, and the political aversion to surpluses have
forced a withdrawal to a different kind of activism - a planned
and even-handed activism called gradualism. It was not the
Eisenhower doctrine of "wait and see," but is better defined
as "playing it cool." The instability of policy in the 19o0's
had bred instability of economy. The Nixon proposal of




It is apparent that we cannot return to the rigid
rule of annually balanced budgets and reduction of debt as
primary. However, acceptance of a policy of budgets balanced
at full employment of resources, along with periodic readjust-
ment, seems valid within the structure of honest appraisals
of the "state of the art" of forecasting. Steady, albiet
slower, growth will improve the cause and effect analysis.
Likewise, budget policy will require a strong and ready ally
in monetary policy for effective action. Both approaches must
be interperted within a framework of other elements in the
fiscal formula, such as: policy and decisions on regulatory
actions; anti-trust laws and implementation; government
research and development programs; farm support prices; state
and local government fiscal programs; international inflation
trends; etc.
The challenge to the present executive fiscalism is
not small. The country has prospered without significant
recessions for an extended period and with low unemployment.
Future agendas for economic policy will have to resolve problems
of:
1. Extending prosperity without recession;
2. Reconciling prosperity with price stability, such as a
goal for 4 per cent unemployment and a 2 per cent inflation; and,
3. Channeling prosperity's dividends into areas of highest

132
national - not just Federal - priorities.
The national objectives of growth and stability
are bi-partisan and will not change. However, with continued
conservative leadership, the economic package, including the
President's role in fiscal activity, will emphasize growth
with stability - including a stable policy. Stable policy
will at least allow the major actors in the fiscal policy
jungle, the state and local governments, and the consumer,
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